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The NAAEC after Ten Years; A Qualitative Assessment of the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
Chairperson: Alan McQuillan
The North American Agreement oA Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) was 
created as a side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and was designed to address environmental concerns arising from expanded free trade 
within North America that were left outside of NAFTA. At the time the NAAEC was 
signed it was considered by many experts to be the most innovative environmental 
agreement ever executed in association with a trade treaty. This thesis examines how 
well the NAAEC has addressed environmental concerns as well as the overall 
performance of the side agreement during its first decade.
In order to explore and understand these issues the author presents a history and 
analysis of the NAAEC in conjunction with a series of interviews he conducted with a 
variety of professionals having expertise relating to the NAAEC. The author further 
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the agreement, presenting a qualitative 
assessment based on information obtained from these interviews.
This assessment suggests the NAAEC did not live up to the expectations of those 
environmental groups, members of Congress and others who had originally sought a 
strong environmental agreement. The inclusion of the NAAEC only as a separate 
side agreement to NAFTA, with no authority to intervene in NAFTA environmental 
disputes proper, effectively relegated environmental concerns to secondary 
consideration. By not providing police powers or “teeth” in the structure of the 
agreement the NAAEC was essentially set up to fail, and it did.
The silver lining in this agreement, however, is the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC), the central institution created by the NAAEC to 
meet the objectives and goals of the agreement. Examples of how the CEC has 
effectively sought and helped implement cooperative solutions to environmental and 
trade related-disputes, despite the limitations of the NAAEC, and the implications this 
could have for future trade agreements, are also presented.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 1992 U.S. presidential race it was often difficult to watch the news or 
read the paper without hearing or seeing the phrase “that giant sucking sound.” This was 
presidential candidate Ross Perot’s description of what the American public would hear 
as U.S. jobs were lost to Mexico if the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
was passed. Eventually NAFTA did pass and the giant sucking sound, much like Mr. 
Perot’s presidential hopes, quickly faded away. Nevertheless, the anticipated effect 
NAFTA would have on the environment and labor led to the creation of two 
supplemental agreements to NAFTA. These two agreements, the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation and the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation, are collectively known as the side agreements.
On December 17, 1992, the governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States 
entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement. The agreement went into force 
on January 1, 1994 and, at the time, was considered the most comprehensive and unique 
trade agreement ever signed between such large trading partners (Johnson and Beaulieu 
1996).
One of the qualities that makes NAFTA unique is its declared goal, stated in its 
preamble, that puts trade liberalization in the context of sustainable development, where 
sustainable development is the desired end. The NAFTA preamble states that the 
agreement will not compromise public welfare, environmental protection or conservation 
and further claims that the agreement should:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
contribute to the harmonious development of world trade. ..in a manner consistent 
with environmental protection and conservation ... promote sustainable 
development... [and] strengthen the development and enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulation (Housman 1997, p. 10).
The inclusion of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC), often called the environmental side agreement within the framework of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement was, arguably, an attempt to reconcile trade and 
environmental interests into a workable affiliation. The NAAEC went into force 
alongside NAFTA on January 1, 1994 as a parallel agreement separate from, but within 
the framework, of the greater NAFTA.
The NAAEC is a means to ensure that the environmental ideals stated in the NAFTA
preamble are carried forward. The NAAEC obligates the multilateral parties to a series of
commitments aimed at greening international trade between the partners. The text of the
NAAEC states the intent to:
[F]oster the protection and improvement of the environment in the 
territories of the Parties for the well being of present and future 
generations; promote sustainable development based on cooperative and 
mutually supportive environmental and economic policies; increase 
cooperation between the Parties to better conserve, protect, and enhance 
the environment, including wild flora and fauna; support the 
environmental goals and objectives of NAFTA; avoid creating trade 
distortions or new trade barriers, strengthen cooperation on the 
development and improvement of environmental laws, regulations, 
procedures, policies and practices; enhance compliance with, and 
enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations; promote 
transparency and public participation in the development of 
environmental laws and regulations; and policies; promote economically 
efficient and effective environmental measures; and promote pollution 
prevention policies and practices(NAAEC art. 1).
Even with a stated willingness for international environmental cooperation, the task of
implementing such a far-reaching agreement as the NAAEC is complex.
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In most negotiations involving free trade, when the issues of trade and environment 
are brought together they are, unfortunately, often viewed as trade versus environment, 
polar opposites instead of two sides of the same coin. Many trade experts believe that 
environmental provisions are synonymous with barriers to free trade and should not be 
included within a trade agreement. When first examining trade interests and 
environmental considerations it is natural to think in terms of a two-sided approach. 
However, on closer analysis it is apparent that in the negotiations over the inclusion of 
the environmental side agreement within NAFTA the issue was not so black and white.
During the NAAEC negotiations, throughout most of 1993, there were trade and 
environmental professionals and organizations on both sides of the agreement that 
believed support for free trade was a stance against environmental standards or provisions 
and vice-versa, but they were not in the majority. Most positions fell somewhere in 
between and differed in the degree of support for one position over the other. Many 
believed these issues were in fact intertwined, with opinions that varied on whether the 
emphasis should be placed on trade or environment.
The environmental community wanted an agreement that provided greater 
transparency and civil participation in trade negotiations as well as one that ensured 
environmental standards were not sacrificed by expanded trade. The latter concern 
mainly related to Mexico which had environmental standards comparable to the U.S. and 
Canada but lacked the ability and/or will to enforce them. The fear in the environmental 
community was that once free trade was established between the three countries, 
companies would begin moving from Canada and the U S to Mexico to avoid the more
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rigidly enforced environmental laws and regulations in those two countries, thereby 
creating a “downward harmonization.”
In response to this concern the NAAEC emphasized enforcement, specifically that 
each country would be obligated to enforce their existing environmental laws and 
regulations. This approach was preferred over creating international environmental 
standards for all three countries as it avoided the necessity of creating an organization 
with multilateral enforcement powers, which was something the governments of all three 
countries were not willing to do.
To address these concerns as well as others, the NAAEC established the Commission 
for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) as the central institution mandated to meet the 
commitments stated in the environmental side agreement. The CEC attempts to do this in 
innovative ways, particularly the citizens submission process which is often considered 
the “centerpiece” of the agreement. This is the method laid out in Articles 14 and 15 of 
the NAAEC designed specifically to address enforcement, transparency and greater civil 
participation.
These articles describe the process through which a non-govemmental organization or 
private citizen can file a petition (called a “submission”) to the CEC that their 
government is failing to enforce existing environmental standards. If the submission is 
found valid the CEC then investigates and ultimately produces a Factual Record. The 
Factual Record is the final report that can then be released to the public that details the 
offense and what has been done. It contains just the facts and offers neither opinions nor 
recommendations. Once the report is released the involvement'of the CEC is finished.
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The CEC has no judicial or police authority to levy fines or penalties against an offending 
party or government.
The CEC also has the authority to prepare what are called Article 13 Secretariat 
Reports. These reports can be initiated by the Secretariat, a branch of the CEC, and can 
address any environmental issue that relates to NAFTA, which covers essentially all of 
North America. The CEC can also form working groups and develop work programs 
related to environmental issues stemming from trade. Though not originally considered 
the focal point of the agreement, nevertheless these methods can be used to address issues 
of transparency and civil participation.
The problem with the NAAEC is that it is hamstrung from the outset.
Including the NAAEC in NAFTA only as a separate, “side” agreement allows NAFTA to 
function without addressing the environmental issues of enforcement and transparency 
specifically within the NAFTA text. Nowhere does NAFTA require the participation or 
input of any group or commission established by the NAAEC in any environmental 
decisions relating to trade under NAFTA. It is entirely up to the NAFTA commissions 
whether to seek input from the CEC.
The CEC is charged with meeting the goals of the NAAEC, yet is not granted any type 
of police authority to levy fines or sanctions against governments who do not enforce 
their existing laws or against companies who are found to repeatedly violate 
environmental standards. This effectively reduces the NAAEC to an environmental 
“gentlemen’s agreement” between the three countries. The CEC has functioned in 
innovative ways despite the limitations placed on it by the structure of the NAAEC but
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whether this has been enough to adequately meet the objectives of the NAAEC is a 
question that is explored further in this thesis.
To determine if the NAAEC sufficiently addressed environmental concern within the 
context of NAFTA there is a broad gray area that needs to be examined. The question, 
ultimately, is subjective and depends on the point of view of the individual. While 
positions may change over time, it is likely that most experts on these issues will have 
opinions that reflect, at least to some extent, their original positions when the agreement 
was signed.
This paper is designed to examine what some of these positions are and then assess 
the NAAEC from the information garnered. In order to understand the assessment, a 
background, history and summary of the agreement is needed. After this, interviews and 
a subsequent discussion, conducted with professionals who have expertise in the fields of 
environment and trade will be presented, followed by a conclusion. The primary purpose 
of the thesis is to qualitatively assess the NAAEC. The assessment will be drawn from 
the issues analyzed in the discussion section. The discussion section will incorporate the 
answers given by the interviewees to the questions posed, and the assessment, therefore, 
will be based on the information presented from these interviews.
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CHAPTER ONE
History and Background
Origin of the NAAEC
While the NAFTA preamble may have stated aspirations towards sustainable 
development, it is important to remember that NAFTA is a trade agreement and trade’s 
primary focus is always in the area of commerce. The NAAEC is a parallel 
environmental agreement within the larger context of NAFTA and the purpose of the 
NAAEC is not necessarily to address existing environmental problems but to address 
environmental concerns as they might arise within the constraints of a trade liberalization 
agreement (NAFTA).
This was an unusual and unprecedented agreement. At the beginning of the NAFTA 
debate the political and social climate in the U.S. was such that some form of 
environmental standards needed to be included in a trade agreement as far reaching as 
what was then being considered. Improved science and technology coupled with greater 
public exposure and environmental awareness led to demands from Non Government 
Organizations (NGOs) and influential segments within the public sector for concessions 
in the trade agreement that addressed environmental concerns (Johnson and Beaulieu 
1996).
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In May of 1991, in order to gain fast-track* authority to negotiate a free trade 
agreement with Mexico, the administration of President George H. W. Bush (1988-92) 
guaranteed that environmental concerns would be addressed in the agreement. By April 
of 1993, when the new Clinton administration had begun to settle in Washington, very 
little progress had been made incorporating environmental concerns into the trade 
agreement. Preliminary discussions between the Chief of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Environmental Ministers of both Canada and Mexico had 
produced a non-written agreement that they would enter into more talks on environmental 
issues in the near future and they also announced a plan to create a North American 
Environmental Council. These talks were the beginning of what would eventually lead to 
the environmental side agreement (Johnson and Beaulieu 1996). During this time 
NAFTA, and the extent of environmental regulation in the side agreement, remained 
fiercely debated topics among trade interests, politicians, environmentalists and the 
public.
With the inclusion of the side agreements, ratification of NAFTA in the U.S. was still 
by no means assured, but without them NAFTA was guaranteed not to pass. President 
Clinton had made a promise during his campaign that without sufficient provisions on 
environmental and labor issues he would not support NAFTA. Considering the climate 
of public opinion in the U.S. and the political support and influence many of the 
environmental NGOs now enjoyed, the environmental provisions already in NAFTA and
' The online legal reference site FindLaw.com defines fast track authority as trade agreement negotiation 
authority that provides two guarantees essential to the successful negotiation o f trade agreements: (1) a vote 
on implementing legislation within a fixed period o f time, and (2) a yes or no vote on trade agreement 
legislation without allowing amendments to the legislation. In the NAAEC negotiations the agreement 
would be submitted to the House and Senate for ratification after a 90 day period of consultation with 
Congress.
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the existing labor agreements with Mexico were not going to be enough to gain approval 
for the passage of NAFTA (Ferber, Ferretti and Fischer 1995). With public opinion and 
the promise of two presidents in favor of environmental provisions, renewed negotiations 
on the agreements continued for almost a year. On September 14, 1993 in Washington 
D.C., the environmental representatives of the United States, Canada and Mexico signed 
the final legal text of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, to 
be put into force along with NAFTA on January 1, 1994.
Criticism  of the Parallel Approach
In Canada and Mexico, where the domestic parliamentary institutions are mostly
government controlled, the debate was not as public and the ratification of NAFTA was
not necessarily dependent on the inclusion of environmental considerations, neither was it
dictated by popular opinion to the extent it was in the United States. The influence of
popular opinion is a key motivating factor in the American political process and very
often determines legislative action. In the case of NAFTA and the NAAEC debates this
was apparent and perhaps best summed up by this statement from one Washington D C.
political commentator:
[D]espite its important innovations, the NAFTA environmental regime is the product 
not of any fundamental, enduring commitment to environmental values on the part 
of governments in North America, but of a temporary need on the part of a 
Republican and then a Democratic president to secure sufficient domestic support to 
ensure legislative passage of a historic free trade agreement (Munton and Kirton 
1994).^
In the U.S., by the first half of 1993, the NAAEC/NAFTA debates had become a highly 
politically, charged topic.
 ̂In Johnson and Beaulieu 1996, p. 10 note 5.
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From the very beginning of the NAAEC negotiations the political leaders in all three 
countries were clear that there would be no reopening of the NAFTA text, the NAAEC 
would have to stand on its own as a parallel environmental side agreement. This parallel 
track approach has been highly criticized as a fundamental failure by many observers 
who support both free trade and strong environmental standards. Critics assert that the 
failure to integrate trade and environmental issues from the beginning resulted in added 
last minute negotiations over many issues that had to be dealt with quickly and less 
effectively then if they had been included in the original trade negotiations (Housman and 
Orbuch 1993).
Many environmentalists claimed that making the NAAEC a parallel agreement 
virtually ensured that any new environmental provisions not mentioned or included in the 
NAFTA text would face an uphill battle of being considered through the NAAEC by the 
respective governments and trade organizations. The NAAEC would be working from 
the outside in, trying to regulate the environmental agenda once NAFTA was in place. If 
the environmental agreement had been part of the NAFTA text, critics contend, then 
compliance with a specified environmental standard would have been considered before 
or with any decisions on commerce.
This criticism may be valid up to a point, but it is helpful to keep in mind that this 
type of environmental regulation was exactly what the trade interests did not want. They 
wanted very few environmental provisions relating to trade within any part of NAFTA, 
let alone a separate side agreement. The argument was that restrictive national or local 
environmental regulation in one country would lead to unfair trade advantages in 
countries that had little environmental regulation or enforcement (Smith 1993).
10
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Ironically, the concern among trade interests that lack of multilateral environmental 
regulation would lead to unfair trade advantages was partly the catalyst for the creation of 
the environmental side agreement. As one analyst put it “The NAAEC was created out of 
the recognition that a severe gap existed between the Mexican environmental laws on the 
books and the enforcement of these laws which might distort trade to the advantage of 
Mexican producers” (Schuler 1996, p. 364). Whether the multilateral side agreement that 
resulted from these concerns is what trade interests had envisioned is debatable. NAFTA 
alleges to “promote environmental enhancement through trade related development” 
(Schuler 1996, p. 354). The side agreements go further, laying a framework whereby 
these goals may be achieved. The legitimacy of the criticism that environmental 
concerns were not adequately addressed within the trade agreement is an issue that will 
be explored further in this paper. One point of accord among analysts and critics on all 
sides of the issue is the critical role NGOs played in the development of the NAAEC.
The Role of NGOs
The call for sustainable development proclaimed in the NAFTA preamble and 
supported by the NAAEC requires a collaborative effort between multiple parties to 
succeed. The NAFTA negotiations have shown that political support from domestic 
populations within participating governments was crucial to the passage of the side 
agreements. In the U. S. and, to a lesser degree Canada, government response is often 
dictated by political pressure from their respective constituents who in turn are greatly 
influenced by the media.
11
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Arguably, it was the media who educated and, for the most part, involved and 
informed the general public in the debates that would possibly impact the environmental 
health of many areas of North America for years to come. This leads to the question of 
who educated or informed the media. Neither the trade organizations, that have long held 
the view that strategy which protects the environment weakens competitive advantage 
and restricts trade, nor the agencies within the separate governments which are often 
controlled by or support executive policy, alerted the media. Rather it was NGOs, 
operating separate from government and trade interests, which are credited with alerting 
the media to patterns of environmental neglect as part of their campaign to influence 
trade policy in favor of the environment that ultimately resulted in the NAAEC (Ferber, 
Ferretti, and Fischer 1995).
The coordinated and combined efforts from the NGOs, particularly in the U.S., took 
many trade negotiators by surprise. A number of events prior to NAFTA had seasoned 
many of the environmental groups for the type of campaign launched in response to the 
initial NAFTA talks. The Bruntland Report^ was presented to the United Nations in 1987 
and stressed the urgent need for global cooperation in progressing toward economic 
development that could be sustained without degrading the environment or depleting 
natural resources. The report established the paradigm of “sustainable development,” 
defining it as, “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland 1987). In the 
decade preceding the Brundtland report, many environmental activists and groups had
 ̂ In 1983 the United Nations appointed an international commission chaired by Norwegian Prime Minister 
Gro Harlem Brundtland. The commission was charged with proposing strategies for “sustainable 
development”. The commission’s report was called “Our Common Future” but became known as “The 
Brundtland Report” (the Brundtland City Energy network).
12
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already begun to shift their focus from primarily localized environmental problems to a 
more global view.
The report catalyzed the organizational structure and vision of some of the larger 
NGOs and they began to monitor and study the environmental impact of economic 
decisions among different countries. They realized the connection that exists between 
trade and the environment and began viewing them as “two sides of the same coin” 
(Johnson and Beaulieu 1996). These NGOs then started lobbying in numerous countries 
to influence economic decisions that had multilateral environmental implications.
During this time the potential hazards from waste emissions, soil and air pollution, 
climate changes, and ozone and natural resource depletion, which the scientific 
community had been warning about for years, was taking on new significance as the 
cumulative effects of systematic environmental degradation were becoming apparent. 
This, combined with the efforts of the NGOs, raised the environmental alarm on a global 
scale and prompted the international community to study the patterns of global 
environmental interdependence culminating in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.^
When initial trade talks between the U.S. and Mexico first began in 1990, prior to 
Canadian involvement, the reaction by environmental groups was quick and organized.
In addition to the burgeoning multilateral concerns between NGOs, the horrendous 
environmental record of the Maquiladoras^ provided vivid images of environmental 
degradation along the U.S.-Mexican border and served as a rallying point for the
'* Attempts to address the issue o f potential conflicts between trade and environment at the Summit were 
meant with strong opposition from the US and other developing countries. As a result the issue was 
deferred to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See Peter H. Sand, International Environmental 
Law After Rio, {European Journal o f International Law 4, 1993); no. 3, 377-389.
 ̂The Maquiladoras are Foreign-owned assembly plants in Mexico. Companies import machinery and 
materials duty free and export finished products around the world. They are also known as twin plants, 
maquilas and in-bond industries.
13
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inclusion of environmental provisions in any future trade agreement between the two 
countries.
The weakness and lack of funding for environmental law enforcement in Mexico led 
to widespread concern among environmental groups in the U.S., Mexico and, eventually, 
Canada that expanded trade in the region would lead to the creation of pollution havens 
that would provide “perverse” incentives for industry to relocate in these areas. Labor 
unions expressed similar concerns, fearing that cheap labor across the border would lead 
to unfair advantages for industries relocating there and the loss of many jobs 
domestically.
The 1991 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) decision in the Tuna- 
Dolphin case,^ which ruled that efforts by the U.S. to protect resources beyond its borders 
(in this case dolphin) were inconsistent with international trade rules, raised a red flag for 
many environmental groups. The Tuna-Dolphin ruling, for many NGOs, gave credence to 
their fears that environmental issues would always be disregarded in favor of commerce 
under the current standards in existing trade agreements. Most of the NGOs involved had 
no doubt that without sufficient multilateral environmental provisions a trade agreement 
of this scope would have tremendous adverse impact on natural resource conservation 
and human health in many industrial corridors, particularly on the U.S-Mexico border.
The border area quickly became the focal point for organized resistance from 
environmental groups and others to the current structure of NAFTA. Their agenda was to 
prevent issues like downward harmonization, the “race to the bottom,” from becoming a
® United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Mexico v. United States) (1991), GATT Doc. DS21/R, 
39* Supp. B.I.S.D. (1992) 155; 30 I.L.M. 1594. In Johnson and Beaulieu 1996, 25. The U.S. treated 
physically identical goods, tuna, differently according to the manner in which they were caught, harvested 
or processed and this was determined by A GATT tribunal to be a violation o f GATT rules. The U.S. can 
protect tuna but only through “less trade restrictive measures.”
14
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reality, and to prevent rulings like the Tuna-Dolphin case from setting precedent. The 
resolution proceedings for the Tuna-Dolphin case were a closed-door process in 
accordance with GATT dispute procedure (Chamovitz 1992). Under the 1986 U.S. - 
Canada Free Trade Agreement^ similar closed door proceedings were used in dispute 
resolution scenarios. The NGOs sought to increase transparency in these types of 
proceedings by opening them to public participation and scrutiny.
The Canadian Environmental Law Association claims that:
A secretive, unelected international commission that favors industry over the 
environment will rule on trade disputes and give a voice to corporations that 
is denied to environment protection organizations and the general public.
The panel will meet behind closed doors, and the public will hear only its 
final decision (Toronto, 1992 at 1).*
This process runs counter to the U.S. and Canadian models of open regulatory hearings 
and was exactly the type of commission that NGOs were hoping to prevent by 
influencing the NAFTA agreement.
In response to these concerns NGOs in all three countries began collaborating. The 
Mexican advocacy group, Grupo de los Cien, initially made contact with similar groups 
in the U.S. and Canada. On April 5, 1991, environmental groups in the three countries 
jointly released to the press a “Common Declaration by Environmental Groups in 
Mexico, the United States and Canada Regarding the North American Free Trade 
Agreement” (Ferber, Ferretti, and Fischer 1995). Other statements by various NGOs, 
published both individually and jointly, soon followed, expressing additional concerns to 
their respective governments.
’ See Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 22 December 1987. 
® In Johnson and Beaulieu 1996, p 28 note 44.
15
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At the same time, NGOs in the U.S. were lobbying congress to open NAFTA 
negotiations using the border issue as a way in. They continuously repeated the message 
that, “if NAFTA did not properly address the environmental concerns, the environmental 
degradation of the border area would spread to the rest of the planned free trade zone” 
(Johnson and Beaulieu 1996, p. 27). The success of this lobbying garnered enough 
support among congressional leaders to make President Bush’s fast track authority 
contingent on an acceptable environmental plan.^
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Mexican Secretaria de Desarrollo 
Urbano y Ecologia (SEDUE) addressed these concerns by releasing the “Integrated Plan 
for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area (Border Plan)” for public comment in August of 
1991.̂ ® In addition The U.S. Trade Representative, in lieu of an environmental impact 
assessment, released the “Review of US-Mexico Environmental Issues” for public 
comment in October of 1991.*' The EPA and SEDUE held seventeen public hearings 
along the border area to elicit response to the Border Plan.
The response was not favorable and criticism of the draft included:
1) Lack of financing for improvements;
2) The plan did not address health related pollution problems and hazardous waste 
disposal;
3) Minimal attention was given to water supply and pollution problems;
4) No wetlands or wildlife protection was included in the plan;
5) There were no provisions for bi-national pollution enforcement;
6) The public had limited access and the plan recommended future study without 
taking any immediate action.;
® See Letter from House Majority Leader Richard Gepharrt to President George Bush, March 17, 1991. In 
Johnson and Beaulieu 1996, 27.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Secreteria di Desarollo Urbano y Ecologia (1992), Integrated 
Environmental Plan fo r  the Mexican-US Border Area (First Stage, 1992-4)(Feb). In Ferber, Ferretti, and 
Fischer, 1995, note 9; 92.
“ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano (1991), ‘Review o f  US- 
Mexico Environmental Issues’ (Oct.), draft. In Ferber, Ferretti, and Fischer 1995, note 10; 92.
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The final Border Plan, released in February of 1992, was rejected by the NGOs as an 
“inadequate response to existing environmental problems and increased pressures under 
[the] free trade agreement.” The Border Plan had ignored most of the NGOs’ previously 
stated concerns (Ferber, Ferretti, and Fischer 1995, p. 86).
Reaction to the Environmental Review was also negative. The NGOs involved 
criticized it as biased on most of the issues in favor of trade, and that it focused almost 
exclusively on the border area. When the final Environmental Review was released in 
February of 1992, it ignored most of the concerns from the environmental groups.
This lack of responsive action from the government agencies in the U.S. and Mexico 
prompted further collaboration between NGOs from all three countries to prepare specific 
and comprehensive recommendations. Among the most notable were the jointly released 
“Environmental Issues Related to the North American Free Trade Agreement” by the 
National Wildlife Federation, and Pollution Probe Canada, on March 7, 1992 and the 
“Review of Environmental Concerns Arising from a North American Free Trade 
Agreement” released April 7, 1992 by the Natural Resource Defense Council et al. 
Though differing in specifics, most of the recommendations were demanding that similar 
concerns be addressed. P.M. Johnson and A. Beaulieu in “The Environment and 
NAFTA” summarize them as;
(1) Guarantees for upward harmonization of environmental standards in the 
NAFTA area
(2) More transparency and NGO participation in the administration and dispute 
settlement mechanism of NAFTA
(3) Better enforcement of environmental regulations as well as some built-in 
procedure to make violations of this principle actionable under NAFTA (thus 
raising the possibility of trade sanctions)
(4) Elaborated protection of environmental laws and regulations against 
pre-emption and NAFTA trade discipline challenges
(5) A major and well-financed effort to clean up the Mexico-US border area
17
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(1996 p. 28).
While most of the credit for assembling political influence on the environmental side 
of this issue is given to U.S. NGOs, the initial effort at organizing by the Mexican 
environmental groups, and the further collaboration with the U.S. and Canadian groups, 
helped the Mexican NGOs to gain some political leverage in their country while at the 
same time demonstrating that the border issue was not exclusively a concern of U.S. 
NGOs. Yet it was the U.S., as the largest and most powerful trading partner, that would 
set the example for integrating trade and environmental policy.
When NAFTA was completed in August of 1992, some of these concerns had been 
marginally addressed but not enough to meet even the minimal requirements for support 
from the larger NGOs. As a result none of the NGOs supported the NAFTA package by 
September of 1992 (Audley n.d ). Soon after, the government representatives of the three 
countries in response to the political pressure mentioned earlier, agreed to negotiate a 
parallel environmental side agreement. Once these intentions were announced the 
National Wildlife Federation (NWF) declared their support for the NAFTA package, 
contingent on the completion of the side agreements, thereby becoming the first of the 
larger NGOs to do so.
It was at this point that division within the environmental community began to arise. 
Essentially there were some groups that were satisfied with working towards a strong 
environmental side agreement without reopening the NAFTA text, and other groups that 
had misgiving about the effectiveness of parallel agreements that would not directly 
modify trade policy. The latter group, headed by the Friends of the Earth and the Sierra
18
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Club, wanted to reopen NAFTA and renegotiate the environmental provisions therein, a 
request the three governments were adamant about not granting.
In October of 1992, presidential candidate Clinton, whom the environmental NGOs’ 
almost unilaterally endorsed, announced that he would support NAFTA only if side 
agreements on the environment and labor were inc luded .F u rther rifts in the 
environmental community then developed when the National Wildlife Federation and the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), whose main agenda as it related to NAFTA was poverty 
relief through trade induced growth, urged candidate Clinton not to make NAFTA 
conditional on a strong NAAEC (Johnson and Beaulieu 1996).
After the 1992 election President Clinton made clear his support of the parallel track 
approach for the side agreements. It was then that twenty-five environmental 
organizations sent a letter to U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Mickey Kantor relating 
their concerns and expectations regarding the environmental side ag reem en ts.T he 
letter had the support of influential groups such as the Sierra Club, Defenders of Wildlife 
and Friends of the Earth. Other groups with political clout, such as NWF, WWF and the 
National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) would not support the letter as drafted. The 
letter went beyond the environmental agenda within the NAAEC and criticized NAFTA, 
emphasizing changes within the NAFTA text, which could only be done by reopening 
that agreement (Audley n.d.). These latter groups had already made known their 
intentions to work with government agencies on the parallel track approach without
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) went into force on January 1, 1994 
alongside NAFTA. The NAAEC and NAALC are often referred to as the NAFTA side agreements on 
environment and labor. Bill Clinton, “Expanding Trade and Creating Jobs,” reprinted in (1993) 23 
Environmental Law at 683-684. See also: Presidential candidate Gov. Bill Clinton, Address, University of 
North Carolina, October 4, 1992. In Johnson and Beaulieu 1996, 31.
Defenders o f Wildlife, Center for International Environmental Law et al., Letter to Ambassador Mickey 
Kantor, March 6, 1993.
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reopening NAFTA. In light of the continued demands by a faction of NGOs to reopen 
NAFTA, regardless of the three government’s steadfast refusal to do so, it appeared these 
NGOs were not going to support NAFTA on any of the terms being proposed.
On May 7, 1993 the Center for International Environmental Law, Defenders of 
Wildlife, the Audubon Society, the Nature Conservancy, NWF, WWF and NRDC 
published a letter in support of “a NAFTA/NAAEC package that reduced the pressure on 
USTR Mickey Kantor and therefore lowered the threshold of what the government was 
expected to accomplish” (Johnson and Beaulieu 1996, p. 33). Despite the criticism this 
letter received from many environmental groups, and even some politicians that it gave 
up too much, the public view was that the major NGOs were behind a NAFTA package 
as long as the NAAEC properly addressed environmental concern. In effect the May 7 
letter became the standard through which the NAFTA package was to be judged (Audley 
and Uslaner 1994).
On September 13, 1993, the Sierra Club, with the support of some 300 smaller 
environmental organizations, declared its opposition to the NAFTA package. The next 
day, September 14, the NWF, WWF, NDRC, the Environmental Defense Fund, Audubon 
and Conservation International announced, at a press conference attended by Vice 
President A1 Gore and EPA Administrator Carol Browner, their support for the 
NAFTA/NAAEC package. This public split within the NGO community was a signal 
that their differences were irreconcilable and caused an alliance of environmental groups 
against each other. The split came a month before the final vote for NAFTA approval 
was to be held, negating any chance to further influence the vote with a unified front in 
the 11* hour (Audley n.d.).
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By the time this formal public split within the NGO community occurred, the 
NAFTA environmental side agreement debate, that appeared likely to determine the 
success or failure of NAFTA in the fall of 1992, had faded from the forefront of both the 
public and the political forum (Duquette 1997). The letter on May 7, supporting a 
NAFTA package with an extensive NAAEC was a culmination of the effort by those 
NGOs that were trying to work towards a “greener” NAFTA. Many analysts claim that 
this letter had come at a cost of much of the political leverage the NGOs had had. The 
political influence the environmental community might still have been able to wield, to 
further strengthen provisions within the NAAEC in the final months before the vote in 
Congress, was diminished by the division within the environmental community. When 
the vote was held in the fall of 1993, the perception of the general public was that the 
NAAEC had adequately addressed the environmental concerns of NAFTA (Audley n.d.).
In order to fully understand the material presented, a review of the objectives and 
institutional procedures of the agreement is necessary. The next section of this project 
will summarize the content, structure and function of the NAAEC.
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CHAPTER TWO
Overview of the NAAEC
Purpose and Objectives
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation was created in 
response to concern that liberalized free trade through NAFTA would lead to increased 
environmental degradation in impacted areas. The agreement establishes a tri-national 
cooperative framework for implementing environmental protection. The NAAEC is an 
international legal instrument that commits the participating parties to a series of 
obligations aimed at achieving specific objectives. Johnson and Beaulieu claim that like 
many international legal instruments, the NAAEC is a constitutional rather than a 
regulatory document (1996). It establishes no specific environmental standards, 
regulations or rules; rather it creates an institutional framework to facilitate 
environmental cooperation among the trading partners.
The NAAEC preamble states the principles behind the agreement. These include the 
declaration that the governments of the United States, Mexico and Canada will 
emphasize public participation in protecting the environment, acknowledge the link 
between trade and environment and build on existing international environmental 
agreements and laws to promote cooperation (NAAEC art. 5). Part one follows the 
preamble and lists the objectives of the agreement as;
22
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(1) Foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the territories of 
the Parties for the well-being of present and future generations
(2) Promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually 
supportive environmental and economic policies
(3) Increase cooperation between the Parties to better conserve, proteet, and 
enhance the environment, including wild flora and fauna
(4) Support the environmental goals and objectives of NAFTA
(5) Avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers
(6) Strengthen cooperation on the development and improvement of environmental 
laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices
(7) Enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws and 
regulations
(8) Promote transparency and public participation in the development of 
environmental laws, regulations and polieies
(9) Promote economically efficient and effective environmental measures
(10) Promote pollution prevention policies and practices (NAAEC art. 7, 1).
Following these objectives in Part Two of the agreement is a series of obligations
agreed upon by the participating parties. These are outlined as general commitments,
levels of protection, publication, government enforcement action, private access to
remedies and procedural guarantees. Key features in this section include:
public access to judicial and administrative procedures and rulings as they relate to 
environmental law;
ensure that each Party’s laws and regulation provide for high levels of environmental
protection and strive to improve these laws and regulations;
effectively enforce its (each Party’s) environmental laws and regulations;
ensure that interested persons may request the appropriate authorities investigate
alleged violations of its environmental laws and regulations and;
ensure that the procedure for developing their environmental laws are impartial,
transparent and equitable.*'^
NAAEC art. 3; 4(1); 5(2); ,6(3)(c); 7(1).
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The Commission for Environmental Cooperation
Part Three of the agreement describes The Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation, which is the central institution created by the NAAEC. The CEC has a 
general mandate to:
cooperate with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission to achieve the environmental 
goals and objectives of NAFTA by:
(1) Contributing to the prevention or resolution of environment-related trade 
disputes
(2) Consider on an ongoing basis the environmental effects of the NAFTA
(3) Otherwise assist the Free Trade Commission in environment-related matters
(4) Assess the environmental impact of proposed projects subject to decisions by a 
competent government authority and likely to cause significant adverse 
transboundary effects.
To facilitate these objectives the CEC is divided into three component institutions, the
Council of Ministers, the Secretariat and the Joint Public Advisory Committee.
The Council
The Council consists of cabinet level ministers from each country who serve as the 
governing body of the Commission. This intergovernmental body will meet once a year 
in regular session and each party shall chair each session successively. Special sessions 
can be held at the request of either party and decisions will be made by consensus unless 
otherwise stipulated in the agreement.*®
The Council acts as the political arm of the CEC. The Council approves the CEC 
budget and oversees the Secretariat. They decide questions regarding the interpretation 
or application of the agreement and act as the final point of inquiry from NGOs and 
private individuals. Final authority in dispute matters pertaining to the agreement rests
NAAEC art. 10(6); 10(6)(c)(d)(e), 10(7)(a). 
Ibid.. art. 9(3), 3(a)(b).
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with the Council and they serve as a forum for the discussion of environmental matters 
within the scope of this agreement/^
In addition to the procedural functions set down for the Council, the NAAEC allows 
for the organic growth of the Council within the reach of the agreement. The Council is 
mandated to encourage compliance, among the Party’s, with their respective 
environmental laws and regulations and promote public access to information concerning 
the environment that is held by public authorities of each Party. The agreement allows 
for the development of recommendations for future environmental disputes and:
Recognizing the significant bilateral nature of many transboundary environmental 
issues, the Council shall, consider and develop recommendations with respect to:
(1) Assessing the environmental impact of proposed projects likely to cause 
significant adverse transboundary effects
(2) Notification, provision of relevant information and consultation between 
Parties with respect to such projects; and
(3) Mitigation of the potential adverse effects of such projects.
While the agreement provides no specific procedural guidelines for the implementation 
of these recommendations, the agreement does recognize the possible future need to do 
so and provides for the organizational structure at the discretion of the Council.
Under the Council Articles in the NAAEC are sections that stipulate courses of action 
the Council shall do and action the Council may do. Considering the broad mandate of 
the CEC, the NAAEC allows for future courses of action that may be necessary 
depending on the situation. These actions are discretionary in nature and are decided 
upon by the Council and include:
(1) Establish and assign responsibilities to, ad hoc committees
(2) Seek the advice of non governmental organizations or persons
(3) Take such other action in the exercise of its functions as the Parties may agree
Ibid., art. IO(l)(a)(d)(f), 6(a).
Ibid art. I0(4)(a)(b), 5(a), 7(a)(b)(c).
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The council may consider, and develop recommendations regarding:
(1) Pollution prevention techniques and strategies
(2) The use of economic instruments for the pursuit of domestic and internationally 
agreed environmental objectives
(3) Transboundary and border environmental issues
(4) The conservation and protection of wild flora and fauna and their habitat and 
specially protected natural areas
(5) Environmental matters as they relate to economic development
(6) Approaches to environmental compliance and enforcement
(1) Other matters it may decide/^
The tri-national membership of the Council provides the leadership to institute the
mandate of the CEC. They are to work closely with the Joint Public Advisory Committee
and the Secretariat, and it is the Council who has final authority on whether information
from any environmental inquiry is released to the public.
The Secretariat
The Secretariat is the second component of the CEC and its function and structure is 
supportive in nature. The Secretariat is instructed to “provide technical, administrative 
and operational support to the council and to committees and groups established by the 
council” (NAAEC art. 11(1)). An Executive Director, chosen by the council for a three- 
year term, with a two-term limit, supervises the Secretariat and each director will rotate 
consecutively between citizens of each participating country.
The director appoints the staff of the Secretariat, taking into consideration “lists of 
candidates prepared by the Parties and by the Joint Public Advisory Committee”
(NAAEC art. 1 l(2)(b)). The appointment of staff is at the discretion of the director but 
the Council has the authority to reject any appointment by a two-thirds vote. The director
19 Ibid.. art. 9(5)(a)(b)(c); I0(2)(b){d)(g)(i)(I)(p)(s).
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also submits the annual program and budget of the commission for final approval by the 
Council (NAAEC art. 11(3), (6)).
Under the articles of the NAAEC the Secretariat is directed to protect from disclosure 
the identity of an NGO or individual making a submission as well as the nature of the 
submission when the source of the submission deems it proprietary.^® This does not apply 
to submissions claiming a Party is not enforcing its environmental laws, which are 
covered separately under articles 14 and 15.
The annual report to the Commission is prepared by the Secretariat and covers the 
approved Commission budget, yearly activities and expenses and “shall periodically 
address the state of the environment in the territories of the Parties.” This includes 
“[T]he action taken by each Party in connection with its obligations under this 
agreement” and information submitted by NGOs and individuals on enforcement 
activities within the Parties (NAAEC art. 12(2)(3).
The CEC, under the authority of the Secretariat, has the discretionary power to 
prepare reports and studies on “any matter within the scope of the annual program.” The 
Secretariat may prepare a report on “any other environmental matter related to the 
cooperative functions of this agreement,” subject to a two-thirds veto by the council 
within 30 days of notification (NAAEC art. 13(1)). The exception to this is issues 
pertaining to non-enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, which are covered 
separately. When preparing reports outside the annual program the Secretariat may use 
information from NGOs, technical and scientific experts, public information, and advice 
from the Joint Public Advisory Committee or other credible sources. The report is
20 Ibid., art. ll(8)(a)(b).
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submitted to the council and made public within 60 days unless the council decides 
otherwise (NAAEC art. 13(2)(3)).
Articles 14 and 15, pertaining to issues on enforcement matters and factual records, 
fall under the purview of the Secretariat and are often considered two of the most 
pioneering articles in the agreement. Article 14 directly addresses the process by which a 
private citizen, NGO or other group, from a participating country may submit, and the 
Secretariat consider, a complaint that a “Party is failing to effectively enforce its 
environmental laws” (NAAEC art. 14(1)).
When a complaint is submitted (a submitted complaint is called a submission in the 
articles of the agreement) the Secretariat determines if the submission meets certain 
criteria such as:
(1) The submitting party is identified and is a national of a participating country;
(2) The claim is legitimately targeting enforcement and not harassment aimed at a 
specific industry and;
(3) The party submitting a complaint has notified, in writing, the proper authorities 
in the targeted territory and that countries response, if any.^*
Once the Secretariat establishes that the submission meets the specified criteria it can
then consider requesting a response from the offending Party, pursuant to certain
guidelines.
In addition to the criteria, there are specific factors the Secretariat is mandated to 
consider before requesting a response from a Party. These include;
(1) Whether the submission alleges harm to the complainant;
(2) If private remedies have been pursued;
(3) Whether the submission is drawn exclusively from media reports and;
(4) If the submission involves matter whose further study would advance the goals 
of the agreement.^^
Ibid., art. 14(l)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f). 
Ibid., art. 14(2)(a)(b)(c)(d).
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If the Secretariat decides a response is warranted, a copy of the compliant and any 
supporting documentation is forwarded to the Party, which then has thirty days to 
respond. When the Secretariat receives the response a decision is made whether to pursue 
the matter further.
At this point the Party against which a complaint has been made can stop the 
proceedings if it can ascertain and show that the complaint is the “subject of a pending 
judicial or administrative (presumably) proceeding.” The Party may also present 
documentation on any previous judicial or administrative hearing the issue received and 
whether available private remedies were utilized^^.
The next step is the development of a factual record under Article 15. If the 
Secretariat deems that a factual record is warranted, it then notifies the Council of its 
decision. The Council must then approve the request by a two-thirds vote. Under these 
procedures, once the Secretariat decides to prepare a factual record, the group or 
individual submitting the complaint has no further function other than support in the 
process. When preparing the factual record the Secretariat is mandated to “consider any 
information furnished by a Party” and, at its discretion, may consider any relevant 
information available publicly, from NGOs, the Joint Public Advisory Committee, or 
from their own or independent experts. '̂*
The factual record is sent to the Council for approval, and any Party can make 
additional comments within 45 days before the factual record is released. If the Council 
agrees by a two-thirds vote to release the factual record, it is then released publicly within 
60 days of its final submission to the Council.
“  Ibid., art. 14(3)(a)(b){i)(ii). 
^  Ibid., art. I5(4)(a)(b){c).
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The original submission procedures, under articles 14 and 15, initially generated 
controversy on how the internal procedures should be applied within the CEC. In the 
spring of 1995, to eliminate any confusion, the Secretariat produced the “Draft 
Procedures for submissions on enforcement matters under articles 14 and 15 of the 
NAAEC” (referred to as Draft Procedures). These procedures address disputed sections 
of Articles 14 and 15 and establish specific criteria as it relates to the submission process 
leading to a factual record.
When an individual or NGO submits a claim that a party is failing to enforce its 
environmental laws, the claimant must remain within the limits of the Party’s 
environmental law. For example, if an industry is releasing a known pollutant into the air 
in a Party’s territory and there is no law against this then, regardless of whether the 
pollutant is harmful, a submission cannot be accepted. Under the Draft Procedures, the 
environmental law and the specific provision within the law that is violated must be 
identified and if there is no law against an act then there is no violation.
The Joint Public Advisory Committee
The Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) consists of fifteen individuals 
comprised equally of five members from each participating country. “Each Party or, if 
the Party so decides, its National Advisory committee convened under Article 17,^  ̂shall 
appoint an equal number of members.” Although the Council “shall establish the rules of 
procedure for the [JPAC],” the JPAC will choose its own chair. It will meet at least once 
a year during the regular session of the Council and may convene at other times as the
Article 17 states: “Each Party may convene a national advisory committee, comprising members o f its 
public, including representatives o f non-governmental organizations and persons, to advise it on the 
implementation and further elaboration o f this Agreement.”
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“Council, or the committees chair with the consent of a majority of its members, may 
decide.” ®̂
The JPAC provides advice “on any matter within the scope of this agreement” to the 
Council and provides technical, scientific or other information to the Secretariat, as 
needed, for the development of a factual record. The JPAC also receives from the 
Secretariat copies of the annual program, budget and any other report “pursuant to article 
13,” which gives discretionary powers to the Secretariat to form independent 
investigations on which the JPAC may advise (NAAEC art. 16(4)(5).
Essentially, except for the submissions process under Articles 14 and 15 of the 
NAAEC, the JPAC is the means by which input from NGOs and other groups in the 
private sector will be included, or at least considered, in the actions of the CEC. The 
JPAC’s function as a nongovernmental advisory group allows it to seek relevant 
information from almost any outside source it deems appropriate. The formal inclusion of 
a nongovernmental body in the structure of the CEC ensures that an institutionalized 
attempt at increased transparency, a stated objective of the NAAEC, is a fundamental part 
of the agreement.
There are a total of 51 Articles and a number of annexes and addendums to the 
NAAEC. This chapter has summarized the first 16 Articles of the agreement that have 
direct relevance to this paper. The remainder of the agreement has four additional 
sections covering cooperation and provision of information, consultation and resolution 
of disputes between participating governments, general provisions and final provisions. 
While these sections are important they are mostly procedural functions as they relate to 
the CEC except for dispute resolutions between governments which will be addressed
“ Ibid., art. 16(I)(2)(3).
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later in this thesis. Any additional sections of the agreement not specifically covered in 
this section will be analyzed in the next section of this paper should it have relevance to a 
topic being discussed.
The next section of this thesis [or project] will present interviews conducted with 
various professional individuals who have expertise in environmental law, policy, trade, 
resource management and other related fields. The interviews will provide the basis for 
the discussions, which, in turn, will provide the material used for assessing the 
performance of the agreement during its first decade.
32
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER THREE
Methodology
Seven interviews were conducted with individuals that were selected by an ad hoc 
process, seeking persons who have expertise involving trade issues and were either 
involved with the original negotiations in some form or were actively involved with at 
least one of the influential NGOs during that time. The interviews were to be broken 
down as: three representing Canada, three from the U.S., three from Mexico and three 
interviews likely biased towards business interests from any country. The method used to 
determine the people to interview was through research. Repetition of specific individual 
names in the initial research was the first criterion in attempting to determine who to 
interview. An additional method was to check the websites of some of the larger NGOs 
to find their contact person for trade issues, and the same method was to be used for 
government agencies such as the U.S. Trade Representative, the EPA and its equivalent 
agencies in Canada and Mexico.
This approach, however, had limited success. Trying to find the original people 
involved proved to be extremely difficult, the negotiations being over ten years past and 
many positions having been temporary in government, and most of the individuals 
involved in the initial debates from the NGOs having moved on. The language barrier in 
Mexico prevented more thorough research for individuals there, and tracking down 
negotiators on the trade side led to eventual dead ends. Also some of the more politically
33
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
prominent individuals, who were often mentioned in the press during the original 
negotiations, could not fit interviews into their busy schedules.
Eventually the first four interviewees were decided by using this original approach, 
the fact that they agreed to be interviewed helped also. Interview five, a former CEC 
Director, was found from direct contact with the CEC. Interview seven, also a former 
CEC member, was a referral from interview five. This referral was given after 
interviewee five was asked if he knew of another CEC member from Mexico who might 
be agreeable to doing an interview. Interview six was located through initial contact with 
the U.S. EPA and U.S. Trade Representative, both of whom interview six has past 
associations with. After contact with these agencies I was directed to the Center for 
International Law, the NGO where interview six is the current president.
A total of seven interviews was finally decided upon for several reasons, the first and 
most salient being that the information and topics raised by the interviews were becoming 
repetitive and a discernible pattern had emerged. Secondly, the length of the project 
needed to be considered and, finally, the time involved trying to track down these 
interviews was considerable. On the average it took eight weeks from the time the initial 
contact was made with an individual until the interview was conducted. By far the most 
difficult aspect of this project was tracking down individuals who were willing to take the 
time to do these interviews.
The original idea to have an equal number of interviews with representatives from 
each country, and from the trade community, who had participated in the original 
negotiations was discarded as the research progressed for two reasons. The first was as 
just discussed above and the second, and most relevant, was that the assessment is based
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on the information from the discussion section, which expands on topics brought up 
during the interviews. The focus of this project and, therefore, of the interview questions 
was on the performance of the NAAEC since it went into force, not on the structure of 
the agreement decided upon through the original negotiations. As the project progressed 
it became clear that this perspective negated the relevance of interviews with individuals 
who had participated in the original negotiations from the strictly trade side as their 
involvement and interest was primarily with the structure of the initial agreement.
This project does not assess the NAAEC based on the interviewees’ opinions; the 
relevance of the interviews is that they provide the basis for the discussion based on the 
topics brought up during the interview process. Therefore, it was more relevant to seek 
interviews with individuals who had an active working knowledge or involvement with 
the NAAEC over the last ten years rather than only individuals who were involved 
initially. As it worked out six of the individuals fit both criteria, the only possible 
disparity being interview three. The possible disparity being that while this individual 
presumably had a working knowledge of the agreement and the CEC, the NGO this 
individual represented was not “actively” involved with the agreement after it was 
signed. This interview was chosen because the individual was currently the Director of 
the Sierra Club’s Trade Program and had held this position during the original 
negotiations. The Sierra Club was the most prominent NGO to oppose the NAAEC and 
it led the coalition of NGOs that opposed the agreement. The rationale for this choice 
was that the perspective of this interviewee would add more depth to the project.
Potential interview subjects who informed the researcher they had not been involved 
with the NAAEC in some manner relevant to this project during the last ten years were
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dropped from consideration. Six of the interviews were conducted by phone, lasting 
between 15 and 25 minutes generally. This was the agreed upon time for the length of 
the interview but there was no specific limit placed on the time of duration for each 
interview. None of these interviews were recorded, as some of the individuals did not 
want their phone conversations taped. To ensure that each phone interview would carry 
equal weight, each conversation was transcribed by hand on a notepad by the interviewer, 
rather than recording some conversations and not others. The transcription was done 
during and immediately following the interview and the notes were kept in a 6 x 9 
stenographer’s notepad.
The question format was open-ended in that it did not follow a rigid set of questions in 
a specific order. Each interview began with the initial question of, “how well did the 
NAAEC address environmental concerns?” The questions that followed were determined 
by the direction of the interview and are written out during each interview exactly as they 
were phrased in the interview and are reported in the discussion section. This was 
thought to be a more appropriate format for this project as the interviewees are the 
experts and it was their perspective on the agreement that the interviewer was attempting 
to solicit for the material in the discussion section. It was the judgment of the researcher 
that having an organic format allowed the interviewer to ask questions relevant to the 
topics being discussed during the interview instead of adhering to a rigid set of questions 
prepared by the interviewer. The only in-person interview was interview three. This was 
at the request of the interviewee since previous attempts at a phone interview were either 
interrupted or postponed.
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The first interview was conducted with Professor Richard Steinberg; the following
biography is from the faculty list at UCLA.
Professor Steinberg teaches International Business Transactions, International 
Trade Law, National Security Law, public International Law, and Theories of 
International Law. After graduating from law school. Professor Steinberg was 
named a MacArthur Fellow in International Security Affairs at the Center for 
International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, and then a Ford 
foundation Fellow at the Center for General Counsel to the United States Trade 
Representative in Washington, D C., and later as an associate with Morrison & 
Foster in San Francisco. He then served as Project Director at the Berkeley 
Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE) at UC Berkeley. He is on the 
Editorial Board of International Organization and a member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations. Professor Steinberg has written numerous articles and books on 
international law, including The Greening o f Trade Law? International Trade 
Organizations and Environmental Issues (2001).
Professor Steinberg’s answer to the question of how well did the NAAEC address 
environmental concerns was, “very well.” He said the side agreements were ambitious 
and “broke away from a persistent pattern of failure to enforce environmental laws and 
regulations internationally.” He said the agreement realistically addressed enforcement 
issues and cited Mexico as an example. Claiming that while there is still widespread 
corruption in matters of environmental enforcement in Mexico, enforcement is now taken 
more seriously, whereas in the past enforcement was completely unregulated.
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In response to the question of whether trade induced growth in Mexico has led to an 
upward harmonization, guided by the NAAEC, and increased revenue for environmental 
concerns, Professor Steinberg replied “no.” He said there has been some increased 
enforcement as a result of trade regulation stemming from the NAAEC but no improved 
conditions or budgets that could be directly attributed to trade. Professor Steinberg added 
that the predicted pollution havens have not resulted either.
When asked whether public participation in the submissions process under Articles 
14 and 15 has been effective. Professor Steinberg said he believed the benefit of having 
public participation is that this involvement creates a public awareness of environmental 
issues that may not have previously existed. He said public scrutiny presupposes or 
creates an environmental standard to address. In a sense a standard is created (when 
comparing multilateral environmental regulations) that can now be assessed where 
previously none existed or no public forum existed to evaluate these standards.
Professor Steinberg opined that the emphasis placed on the importance of NGO 
participation (in the submissions process) in the agreements was overstated. He said this 
suggests that somehow the NGOs can see problems and respond quicker and more 
competently than government agencies. He also said the criticism that the submissions 
process, leading to a factual record, is overly drawn out is unfounded, in comparison with 
civil proceedings in the U.S. it was relatively swift. Professor Steinberg said overall the 
agreements went a long way in addressing environmental concerns, claiming that it was 
the most ambitious environmental agreement ever included in a trade treaty.
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Discussion
In 1993, a team of legal experts in environmental regulation was sent to Mexico by 
the U.S. EPA to report on the environmental standards in Mexico. They found that 
Mexican laws were “broadly comparable” to Environmental laws in the U.S. (Magraw 
1995). Their findings were little disputed by the larger environmental groups concerned 
with the new trade treaty being discussed. Instead they pointed to this report as further 
proof that lack of enforcement was a major problem in Mexico, one that would become 
worse with increased, unrestricted trade (Ferber, Feretti, and Fischer 1995). The political 
and public pressure brought to this issue by the environmental sector coupled with 
industry’s fear of relaxed regulation creating a competitive advantage in the form of 
“pollution havens” in Mexico, were determining factors in the creation of the NAAEC.
Studies suggest that neither the pollution havens feared nor, as professor Steinberg 
pointed out, has the upward harmonization hoped for occurred. While Mexican foreign 
trade has increased under NAFTA it is not attributed to the creation of pollution havens 
(Schatan 2003). In this study Schatan found that Mexican trade trends have actually 
shifted towards cleaner high-tech industries rather than a specialization towards the 
traditional pollution prone industries. Statistical research showed that the chemical 
sector, considered the most polluting of all industries, had a more rapid growth of imports 
compared to exports since the NAFTA/NAAEC package went into force (Schatan 2003).
Professor Steinberg claimed that increased regulation and enforcement as per the 
agreement has had some impact in Mexico, and a study conducted by the World Bank 
Development Research Group appears to support this assertion. The study found that 
plants in Mexico that experience regulatory inspections and enforcement are considerably
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cleaner than industries that do not experience regulatory inspections. Of the 236 
industrial firms surveyed that were subject to regulatory inspections, 60 % were in
compliance with environmental regulation, primarily due to regulatory enforcement 
(Dasgupta, Hettige, and Wheeler 1997). While these findings may reinforce the benefit 
of regulatory environmental enforcement, other studies suggest that implementing the 
enforcement is still a significant problem in Mexico. The federal Mexican environmental 
watchdog agency Procuraduria Federal de Proteciccion al Ambiente (PROFEPA) 
reported that since the signing of the NAFTA/NAAEC package, plant inspections in 
Mexico, which only reached a high of 6 percent of all industrial firms nationally in 1993, 
has steadily declined (Gallagher 2001).
One of the more optimistic predictions for NAFTA was that trade-induced growth in 
Mexico would translate into bigger environmental budgets and the NAAEC would 
spotlight and guide environmental programs that would arise from a heightened 
environmental awareness (Johnson and Beaulieu 1993). It was hoped that this synergistic 
relationship between trade and environment would eventually lead to an upward 
harmonization in Mexico; an event which Professor Steinberg stated has not occurred. A 
recent study on industrial pollution in Mexico concluded, “[That] despite some notable 
improvements, the environmental costs of trade-led economic growth in Mexico have 
remained high since the entry into force of NAFTA” (Gallagher 2001). The study 
presented figures from the Mexican Statistical Agency, which showed the environmental 
costs of economic growth in Mexico from 1985-1999 at 10 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product per year or roughly $36 billion (US). At the same time economic
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growth was 2.5 percent annually, or $14 billion per year (Gallagher 2003). In 
comparison the CEC has an annual operating budget of $9 million (US).
The inclusion of Articles 14 and 15 on citizen submissions and the creation of a 
factual record within the NAAEC were in response to pressure from NGOs for greater 
transparency and public participation in trade related issues. (Gallagher 2001) According 
to the CEC website, in the ten years since the NAAEC went into force, 43 submissions 
have been received by the Secretariat. Of these 43 submissions, 32 of the cases have 
been closed, 11 are active and nine have resulted in the establishment of a factual record. 
The details of a number of these factual records and how they have led to greater public 
awareness of environmental concerns, as Professor Steinberg suggests, will be discussed 
later in this chapter, however, the very act of creating these factual records focuses 
attention on specific environmental issues that otherwise might have gone unnoticed.
Professor Kal Raustiala in '^Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC' 
describes two types of treaty review, which he calls “police patrols” and “fire alarms.” 
The police patrols are the federal investigative bureaucracy and the fire alarms are the 
investigations triggered by private citizens or groups. Raustiala claims that fire alarms in 
treaties “while not unknown, is unusual; international law rarely permits private actors to 
challenge states.” Raustiala further explains that centralized authorities (police patrols) 
systematically search for violations through means such as hearings, audits, inspections 
and the like. Fire alarms, on the other hand, are reactionary and decentralized, instigated 
by private individuals or organizations that usually have a political or economic stake in 
the outcome of the issue at hand. In other words, as Professor Steinberg said, NGOs and 
private individuals are not necessarily more competent or better equipped than
In Markell and Knox 2003, 270 note 3.
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government agencies, but they might often see problems or be concerned with issues that 
may be overlooked by government agencies. “There is no reason to think the information 
private actors possess is systematically better than that of governments; rather, it is likely 
to be different than that possessed by governments” (Raustiala 2003). Chemical 
pollutants in a fisherman’s favorite stream or a hiker uncovering toxic waste in a remote 
wood are scenarios that would likely be overlooked by more systematic government 
investigations. Under the NAAEC, if a private citizen or group reported the preceding 
scenarios and their government refuses to act, the citizen or group now has another 
avenue in which to pursue their complaint.
Interview Two
The second interview was conducted with Professor Peter L. Lallas. Professor Lallas
is currently a senior attorney in the International Law Office of the U.S. EPA and, as a
representative of the EPA, was involved in the original NAFTA/NAAEC negotiations.
He also lectures at Georgetown University; the following biography is from the faculty
list at Georgetown University.
Professor Lallas provides legal advice and counsel on a wide range of international 
environmental issues, including environment and trade matters, and issues relevant 
to the negotiation and implementation of international environmental agreements.
He is a lead expert in a multi-year environmental cooperation partnership with the 
countries of Central America and coordinates EPA policy work relating to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Prior to joining EPA, he worked on 
international trade and European Community issues in Brussels and on environment 
and land use issues with a California law firm. He has authored and co-authored a 
number of articles on international environmental policy and law themes.
Professor Lallas, in response to the question of how well did the NAAEC address 
environmental concerns, said there are several goals indicated in the NAAEC and looking
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at how well the CEC has met these goals is a valid criterion to measure how well the 
agreement addressed environmental concern. He said the CEC has successfully 
promoted environmental cooperation on regional levels and initiated cooperative 
programs that have been effective. He cited Resolution 95 on the Sound Management of 
Chemicals, which led to the development of North American Regional Action Plans on 
specific chemicals. Another successful initiative, according to Professor Lallas, is the 
Biodiversity Conservation Working group, which he said has led to the establishment of a 
number of projects targeting specific conservation areas. Two goals he claimed that have 
not been successful to date are the development of an agreement on Transboundary 
Environmental Impact Assessments and the establishment of a cooperative relationship 
with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission.
When asked whether the public submissions and the dispute resolution process 
detailed in the NAAEC have been effective. Professor Lallas’s reply was that the public 
submissions process has been used while the dispute resolution process has not. He said 
the agreements took a significant step in recognizing and including public participation in 
the implementation of the agreement in a manner not found in other trade agreements.
He added that Articles 14 and 15 are a straightforward process leading to a factual record. 
This, comparatively, is much less than happens under investment dispute procedures 
under NAFTA where investors can obtain monetary damages from a country under 
Chapter 11.
Professor Lallas said the NAAEC laid out specific goals that address environmental 
concern and some of the goals have met with success while others have not faired as 
well. He said the agreements were new and innovative in connecting trade and the
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environment. They set an early benchmark for state-to-state resolution processes as well 
as those involving private citizens or organizations, though he expressed concern that the 
process is currently being excluded from consideration in the proposed Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA). He said public participation is one of the strengths of the 
agreement and the failure, to date, to realize some of the goals of the agreement have not 
been failures of the CEC. Professor Lallas added that he thought the CEC website, the 
links and information found there, is a multilateral environmental accomplishment in its 
own right.
Discussion
The CEC is the central institution created by the NAAEC and is the means by which 
the goals and mandates stated in the agreement will be carried out. Professor Lallas cited 
numerous examples of working groups, initiatives and programs started by the CEC that 
have actively and successfully worked towards promoting multilateral environmental 
cooperation between various stakeholders. In October 1995, the CEC Council approved 
Resolution #95-5 on the Sound Management of Chemicals (SMOC). The resolution 
called for a multilateral cooperative effort to address chemical issues of mutual concern 
between the participating countries and for the implementation of proposals contained in 
Chapter 19, Agenda 21, of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 (Buccini n.d.). The resolution gave 
first priority to persistent organic pollutants (POPS) and established a tri-national
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working group to develop and implement North American Regional Action Plans 
(NARAPs) on specific chemicals.^^
The working group, composed of two senior officials from each country, was directed 
to recommend intensive efforts to reduce the risks posed by the targeted pollutants (Block 
2003). The group began with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB’s), chlordane, DDT and 
mercury. The program has produced concrete results. Chlordane is no longer registered 
for use in North America, the PCB action plan is working to accomplish the near 
elimination of PCB’s in North America, DDT has been phased out of Mexico (Block 
2003) and the council has been actively engaged in reducing mercury to naturally 
occurring levels and informing the public (and industries) on methods to reduce the risks 
of exposure.^^
Article 10(2) authorizes the CEC to “develop recommendations regarding the 
conservation and protection of wild flora and fauna and their habitat, the protection of 
threatened and endangered species and other matters it may decide.” The Secretariat has 
the authority to prepare reports on any environmental matter within the scope of the 
agreement except on issues related to enforcement failures (NAAEC art. 13). In 1995 the 
Secretariat issued the Report on the Death o f Migratory Birds at the Silva Reservoir in 
Guanajuato State, Mexico, and in 1999, issued Ribbon of Life: An Agenda for Preserving 
Transboundary Migratory Bird Habitat on the Upper San Pedro River in Northern 
Mexico and Southern Arizona. Both these reports directly relate to biodiversity. In June 
2001, Council Resolution 01-03 established the Biodiversity Conservation Working
See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Public Workshop on the Sound 
Management o f Chemical Program and Joint Public Advisory Committee Regular Session. 20-21 
September 2001, Tucson, Arizona.
See the Commission for Environmental Cooperation Council Resolution 00-06, 13 June 2000.
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Group, whose directives include “[to] identify areas of emerging interest or opportunities 
for biodiversity conservation, promote the integration of the CEC’s biodiversity related 
activities and support finalization and effective implementation of the Strategic Plan for 
biodiversity conservation” (Glickman 2003).
The CEC’s 2002-2004 North American Agenda for Action describes seven target 
project areas for biodiversity conservation, spearheaded by the Strategic and Cooperative 
Action for the Conservation of Biodiversity in North America. The program initiatives 
will help guide the Commission’s long term conservation plan as well as provide and 
inform both public and private interests with environmental targets and performance 
indicators (CEC 2002). The other six projects implemented by the CEC cover a wide 
range of concern and will use strategies developed from the above Cooperative Action 
program. These projects are: the North American Bird Conservation Initiative; Species 
of Common Conservation Concern; Mapping Marine and Estuarine Ecosystems of North 
America; North American Protected Areas Network; Closing the Pathways of Aquatic 
Invasive Species across North America; and the North American Biodiversity 
Information Network.
Two areas where Professor Lallas claimed the CEC has not been successful were in 
developing Transboundary Environmental Assessments and establishing a cooperative 
relationship with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission. Article 10(7) and 10(7)(a) of the 
NAAEC mandates the council that “within three years consider and develop 
recommendations with respect to assessing the environmental impact of proposed 
projects.” The CEC began preparations to meet this objective almost immediately and by 
October 1995, the CEC’s project on Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessments
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(TEIA) was launched. In 1997, the participating Parties convened a tri-national group of 
experts who subsequently produced a draft agreement on transboundary environmental 
impact assessments (Knox 2003). In response, the Council passed a resolution intending 
that the Parties would complete a legally binding agreement by April 15, 1998.̂ ®
As of March 2004, the Parties are still negotiating and the problem appears to be in 
the language of the agreement. John Knox, in The CEC and Transboundary Pollution 
writes, ‘The Parties are deadlocked over the scope of the agreements-specifically which 
actions should be considered, ‘proposed projects’ and therefore subject to notification and 
assessment” (2003). In Canada and the United States, environmental impact assessments 
(EIA’s) are required only on federal projects, while in Mexico EIA’s are sometimes 
required on sub-federal and private projects as well. A compromise over this difference 
in “proposed projects” has reached an impasse. Mexico is not willing to amend its 
domestic law to limit EIA’s to only federal projects in fear that by exempting private and 
sub-federal projects from EIA’s, conditions along the border will become worse (Delgado 
1998). Considering the current political climate in the United States it is unlikely there 
would be enough political support to broaden current EIA requirements and Canada faces 
similar obstacles (Kennett 1995).
Article 10(6) of the NAAEC directs the Council to “cooperate with the NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission to achieve the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA.” 
Despite this mandate “the North American governments have yet to call on the CEC’s 
significant trade and environment experience to inform... the deliberations of NAFTA’s 
Free Trade Commission” (Reed and Kelly 2003, p. 102). The CEC has neither been 
called upon for input in any environment related dispute occurring under NAFTA, nor
See Commission for Environmental Cooperation 1997. Resolution 97-03. Pittsburg (June).
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have they yet met with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission. Notwithstanding these 
obstacles, the CEC has been active in pursuing its obligations under Article 10(6), 
producing the Environment, Economy and Trade Program^^ which has led to a new 
analysis methodology used to explore trade and environment linkages in a variety of 
areas.̂ ^
Of growing concern among many in the environmental community, which Professor 
Lallas briefly mentioned, is the application of Chapter 11 disputes under NAFTA. 
Specifically, the concern centers upon the language in Article 1110 (NAFTA Chapter 11) 
that states investors will “[have] protection from expropriation, or measures tantamount 
to expropriation.” What has caused alarm is the use of this provision by some 
multinational corporations to challenge environmental protection initiatives, and 
regulations in the Parties territories. The CEC is actively involved in this debate but, 
once again, has not been called upon by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission in any of 
the environment related investment disputes that have gone to arbitration under Chapter 
11 of NAFTA.
Interview Three
The third interview was conducted with Dan Seligman, Director of The Sierra Club’s 
Responsible Trade Program. The following biography is from the Sierra Club website at 
www.sierraclub.org.
Dan Seligman has been director of the program since April 1993; he led the Sierra
Club’s grassroots mobilization at the Seattle Summit of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). He has also directed the Sierra Club’s lobbying activities
See www.cec.org/programs_projects/trade_environ_econ. In Knox and Markell 2003, 111; note 1.
See CEC, Environment and Trade Series 6-Assessing Environmental Effects o f the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA): An Analytic Framework (Phase II) and Issue Studies 1-64 (1999).
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concerning fast-track trade promotion authority, the WTO, and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. Dan is cited frequently in the media, has testified before 
Congress, and is the author of a variety of reports and articles on trade and the 
environment. Before joining the Sierra Club, Dan was a consultant at the World 
Resources Institute in Washington, D C., specializing in Latin American 
environmental issues. He holds a masters degree in International Economic and Latin 
American studies from the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced 
International Studies and a B.A., with honors, in American history from the 
University of Chicago.
Mr. Seligman, in response to the question of how well did the NAAEC address 
environmental concerns, said there were two ways to look at the NAAEC, was the 
agreement strictly a reaction to the political fallout from NAFTA or a broader insight 
aimed at working with environmental problems. He said the CEC had both roles, as they 
were to oversee environmental cooperation with traded goods and, at the same time, 
establish public forums for environmental conflicts arising from liberalized trade. He 
said the dilemma with the NAAEC was that it was limited (initially) to problems as they 
relate to trade under NAFTA, and that the problem is not trade, but the nature of these 
trade agreements. NAFTA, according to Mr. Seligman, only looks at problems that can 
be solved with investment and tends to ignore the indirect environmental effects from 
liberalized trade. Effects such as natural resource depletion, carbon emissions and 
infrastructure pressure from the migration of large populations to concentrated areas are 
not considered.
When asked if environmental conditions in Mexico have improved from increased 
environmental enforcement that can be attributed to the side agreements, he said some 
things are better controlled like air and water, which can be measured but companies are 
likely polluting less overtly. He claimed the upward harmonization theory that was 
lauded by the pro-NAFTA lobby is “based on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)
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which has been shown to be flawed” and that “Mexico starts below the curve” which 
renders the application of the theory meaningless.
Mr. Seligman said the CEC is a good structure with considerable limitations and that 
it has been beneficial in spotlighting environmental issues and has used its independent 
discretionary functions in a constructive manner likely not foreseen by the trade lobby.
He said the side agreements were a political payoff to the environmental lobby for 
supporting NAFTA, and “there were a lot of broken promises, the environmental lobby 
controlled 35 congressional votes, enough to block NAFTA, instead they took bad deals.” 
Mr. Seligman expressed the opinion that they could, and should have held out for a 
stronger environmental agreement and that the damage from NAFTA outweighs the 
benefit of the NAAEC.
Discussion
One of the shortcomings of NAFTA, according to Mr. Seligman, was that it failed to 
consider the indirect environmental effects of trade. Specific Articles of the NAAEC 
allows the CEC the latitude to develop strategies seeking cooperative solutions to the 
negative environmental impacts of NAFTA that go beyond the immediate and direct 
effects of the expanded trade stemming from that agreement. Article 13(1) of the 
NAAEC grants the Secretariat authority to “prepare a report on any other environmental 
matter related to the cooperative functions of this agreement [unless] within 30 days... 
the Council objects by a two-thirds vote.” In the ten years since the signing of the 
NAAEC, the CEC has been active in attempting to identify and understand linkages 
between trade and environmental change. In its first five years the CEC developed and
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released the Analytical Framework for Assessing the Environmental Effects of NAFTA 
and established an extensive North American cooperative program developed around four 
central themes; of which one, environment, economy and trade, deals explicitly with the 
direct and indirect environmental effects from trade.
The CEC has been active in providing information on pollution release and transfer 
registry programs (PRTR) across North America. A PRTR is a database to which 
facilities must report their annual release of specified chemicals to the environment and 
transfers of these chemicals off-site.^^ In 1995, the CEC Council began work on 
establishing a North American Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI) with the goal of 
improving environmental quality by making publicly available information on North 
American pollutant sources and risks. '̂* Although a complete NPRI, as envisioned by the 
CEC in 1995 has not yet been created, it is not far from being realized. The CEC is 
credited with facilitating the emergence of a multidisciplinary cooperative policy network 
around PRTRs in Canada, Mexico and the United States and supplying information to the 
public, governments and industry, as well as applying pressure to the latter two through 
its annual North American PRTR release Taking Stock (Winfield 2003).
On October 11-12, 2000 in Washington D C., the CEC hosted the “First North 
American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages Between Trade and Environment.” 
The symposium, chaired by Dr. Pierre Marc Johnson, former premiere of Quebec, 
presented research papers from authors in Canada, the United States, Mexico, Latin 
America and the C a r i b b e a n . A  second symposium was held in March 2003 in Mexico
See CEC Council Session in Dallas June 12-13, 2000.
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City. Both symposiums presented papers from academic researchers, NGOs, the private 
sector and representatives from intergovernmental organizations examining the direct and 
indirect effects on the environment from liberalized trade under NAFTA. They explored 
the impact of NAFTA on a range of issues from air quality, freshwater, forests and 
fisheries to the links between free trade and growing rates of hazardous wastes being 
shipped between the U.S., Canada and Mexico (Johnson 2004). The indirect effects that 
were studied considered how NAFTA impacts the environment “as its rules and 
institutions alter trade and transborder investment flows and influence and interact with 
production, infrastructure, social and governmental processes” (CEC 2002).
The 2000 symposium was the first test of the CEC’s new analytical framework for 
assessing linkages between trade and the environment. One primary finding from the 
assessments was that large scale analysis, similar to ones used to examine macro 
economic effects from trade, are potentially misleading in that overall levels of 
environmental change on a continental (or global) scale may appear minor using this 
approach yet may be more significant on a localized scale when measured by geographic 
region, environmental standard or economic division (Vaughan and Block 2002). For 
example:
due to changes induced by consumption patterns of the local population, species and 
genetic diversity may lose their direct or indirect value. Thus the failure of the market 
to allocate global values to natural resources at the local level could have disastrous 
consequences for biodiversity.”^̂
These are some of the indirect effects that were not adequately measured using previous
trade and environmental impact assessment methodology.
Environment and Trade Series. 1996. Building A Framework For Assessing NAFTA Environmental 
Effects. Report of a workshop Held In La Jolla, Ca. CEC (April).
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Additional presentations discussed means by which liberalized trade indirectly affects 
the environment through infrastructure impacts such as long term transportation 
maintenance. This can adversely affect land, water and air well after the initial impacts 
of new roads, railways and other changes in modes of transportation that were 
constructed to accommodate the influx of trade have passed. The increase of alien 
invasive species and their potential impact on ecosystems was explored and directly 
linked to an increase in the transportation corridor, largely from marine transport 
(Vaughan and Block 2002). The exclusion of these concerns and their quantifiable 
impacts in previous environmental assessments of trade and the failure of these 
assessments to produce conclusive negative or positive results regarding NAFTA’s 
impact on the environment, led the CEC to try a new alternative “environment first” 
approach.
This approach is just one of four basic elements to the analytical framework developed 
by the CEC to assess trade and environmental linkages in the NAFTA context. The 
framework first considers the context, in regards to environmental, geographic, economic 
and social scale, of the region or issue being studied; an “environment first” approach. 
The framework then analyzes connections to NAFTA related to NAFTA institutions, rule 
changes, trade flows, multilateral investments and other economic factors. Next it 
explores how changes in government policy, infrastructure, technology, production and 
social organization relate to changes in trade and investment triggered by NAFTA, the 
framework then provides a means for evaluating environmental effects utilizing various 
indicators (Reed and Kelly 2003).^^
37 For a more detailed explanation see Analytical Framework, supra, 32.
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The EKC, which Mr. Seligman said was the basis for the upward harmonization 
premise, is an economic theory that hypothesizes a relationship between various 
indicators of environmental degradation and income per capita. The theory is based on 
the Kuznets Curve, named after the Nobel Prize winning economist Simon Kuznets who, 
in a 1955 paper, observed that income inequality first rises and then falls as economic 
development proceeds (Stem 2003). The Environmental Kuznets Curve essentially 
restates the economic theory to apply to environmental protection by predicting that 
negative environmental impacts will first rise then fall as economic development 
proceeds. The EKC concept surfaced in early studies of potential environmental impacts 
from NAFTA^* but it was the World Bank’s World Development Report 1992, which 
gained widespread acceptance of the EKC as a model for economic development (Stem 
2003).
The World Bank report argued, “As incomes rise, the demand for improvements in 
environmental quality will increase, as will the resources available for investment” (Stem 
2003, p. 4). Grossman and Kmeger showed that per capita income over a certain “tuming 
point” reduced earlier negative environmental impacts (i.e. environmental benefit) from 
economic development (1995). Free trade proponents used the catch phrase “upward 
harmonization” as the natural progression of trade liberalization in developing countries 
based almost exclusively on the EKC.
Numerous studies, conducted since the signing of NAFTA, have questioned the 
validity of the EKC as a rationale for economic development (Dasgupta et al. 2002). 
Many researchers have found the EKC applies in only a limited number of air pollutants
See Grossman, G. M. and A. B. Krueger 1991. Environmental Impacts o f  a North American Free Trade 
Agreement. National Bureau o f Economic Research Working Paper 3914, NBER, Cambridge, MA. In 
Stern 2003, 22.
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such as particulates, ozone, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide and lead 
(Gallagher 2003). Other researchers have found that the reciprocal relationship predicted 
by the EKC depends on the environmental indicators observed and, in fact, greenhouse 
gases and indicators such as loss of biodiversity and primary forests appear to increase as 
income per capita continues to rise (Vaughan and Block 2002). Stem, in Progress on the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve, found the per capita “tuming point” to be well beyond the 
$5,000 (US) Gross Domestic Product claimed by Grossman and Krueger as the income 
level where environmental contamination from economic expansion begins to recede 
(1991).
Additional research has found that even if the EKC holds tme in specific uniform 
situations, the majority of the world’s population who remain below the income per 
capita “tuming point” will never reap the environmental improvements predicted by the 
EKC from trade liberalization (World Wildlife Fund 1998). The argument here, which 
Mr. Seligman (and others) is making, is not that economic development through free 
trade is a bad idea, but that basing that development on the stmcture of the current free 
trade agreement that uses a flawed theory such as the EKC to predict environmental 
benefits is.
Another key issue Mr. Seligman discussed, which was also investigated at the CEC 
symposium (2003) was the ongoing concem that domestic environmental regulation is 
weakened by the structure of trade liberalization agreements like NAFTA. The 400 
percent increase in imports of hazardous waste from the U.S. to Canada was cited as an 
example of how differences in environmental regulatory compliance between two trading 
partners can lead to specific instances of pollution havens (CEC 2002).
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The question is not whether free trade in and of itself leads to better or worse levels 
of environmental quality... However, the effectiveness of environmental regulations is 
of pivotal importance, especially during transitional periods when countries open 
markets to international competition...and move to restructure markets through the 
deregulation of competition policies... [A]s countries move to the convergence of 
trade, investment and competition polices in support of the globalization agenda, a 
similar effort is needed to ensure that robust environmental regulations and polices 
are enacted to anticipate and mitigate environmental impacts stemming from free 
trade (Vaughan and Block 2002).
Vaughan and Block stress the need to mitigate the environmental shocks of trade
liberalization by adjusting the progression of trade agreements to allow environmental
regulators adequate time to adjust to market integration (2002). Similar to the way the
IMF concluded, in a 2001 report, that economic markets need to progress in future trade
agreements to allow domestic markets time to adjust to the impact of international
competition, and avoid repeating the financial crises of the 1990s.^^
It was environmental guarantees such as these that leading NGOs like the Sierra Club,
Friends of the Earth and Public Citizen were looking for in an environmental side
agreement within the NAFTA text, “We are pro-trade...[w]e believe in trade, but it’s got
to be with environmental protection.’’"̂® When it became clear that the environmental side
agreement left each party “free to determine its own level of protection and to modify its
rules’’ these groups withdrew support of the NAAEC and formally opposed NAFTA
(Canovas 2002).
These NGOs would not support a side agreement that had no authority to deal with 
what they believed was the central environmental issue of NAFTA. That in order to 
further commercial interests NAFTA would “[Ejnforce legal ‘disciplines’ on domestic
International Monetary Fund 2001. “Chapter IV: International Financial Integration and Developing 
Countries,” World Economic Outlook: (October). Washington, DC: IMF. In Vaughan and Block 2002,4 , 
note 8.
^  Roni Lieberman, the Sierra Club. Christian Science Monitor, July, 2 1993, 2.
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laws, regulations, and administrative procedures in ways that may sharply restrict 
legitimate health and environmental safeguards” (Seligman 2001). The initial assurances 
given to the environmental lobby that this would not be the case with NAFTA has 
resulted in many of the “broken promises”'** Mr. Seligman referred to, and has led many 
of the major environmental groups who initially supported the NAFTA/NAAEC package 
to oppose any new trade initiatives (Canovas 2001).
Interview Four
The fourth interview was conducted with Justin Ward, Director for Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries with the Center for Environmental Leadership in Business, a
division of Conservation International (Cl). The following biography is from the Cl
website at www.conservation.org.
Prior to joining the Cl staff in April 2000, Mr. Ward was a Senior Policy 
Specialist with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). During more than 
17 years with NRDC, he directed the organization’s activities on farm policy, 
international trade, and global forest conservation. He is the author of numerous 
publications, and the recipient of a 1988 Agricultural Conservation Award from 
the American Farmland Trust. In 1996, Mr. Ward was elected to a three-year term 
on the international Board of Directors of the Forest Stewardship Council, and he 
currently serves on the Board of the Consumer’s Choice Council and on the 
Steering Committee of The Forests Dialogue. During the last three years, he has 
represented Conservation International on the Sustainable Forestry Board’s 
Resources Committee and has been co-chair of the SFB task group on Forests 
With Exceptional Conservation Value.
In response to the question of how well did the NAAEC address environmental 
concerns, Mr. Ward said the agreement addressed region wide environmental concerns in 
innovative ways. It created a tri-national structure in the CEC, and Articles 14 and 15
See Seligman, D. 1996. ‘T he Morning NAFTA”, The Planet Newsletter. Sierra Club. Also Scott, R. E. 
2003. “ The high price o f ‘free’ trade: NAFTA’s failure has cost the United States jobs across the nation” 
Economic Policy Institute, No. 147 (November).
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provided new avenues for bringing attention to environmental issues, which triggered 
closer looks at existing problems. He said this has been of particular benefit in Mexico 
where an avenue for expressing environmental complaint has been created by the 
submissions process.
When asked if the parallel approach has been effective, Mr. Ward responded that he 
“has not been persuaded that a trade agreement is the best route for environmental 
considerations.” He also said that a multilateral institution is now in place and whether it 
is in a trade or environmental agreement is really a secondary consideration. He further 
added that the CEC might have had a different structure with less independence had it 
been included in the NAFTA proper. Mr. Ward said, “You often hear we need 
international environmental governance, you have that now [in the CEC], let’s support it, 
learn from the mistakes.”
Mr. Ward was asked if he felt the NAAEC was lacking any real teeth in regards to 
enforcement provisions. He responded that there are monetary penalties that can be 
levied, but strengthening the enforcement provisions was too political an issue to have 
succeeded. He said, “What were the options, trade sanctions? Environmental standards 
are different in each country so how do you evaluate things like urban air quality.” He 
said The NAAEC creates an institution (the CEC) to address these kinds of problems.
Mr. Ward said the agreement often gets overlooked as an experiment on how to 
address transboundary environmental issues on a multilateral level, “some approaches 
have worked others have not.” When asked if he thought the NAAEC could serve as a 
model for future agreements he replied, “Yes, absolutely it could. It does exist, leam 
from it.” He said looking at whether environmental standards have been enforced is the
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wrong metric, “If the enforcement provisions played out and fines were levied, then we 
failed, environmental improvements were not made.” Mr. Ward added that this does not 
necessarily mean that if fines have not been levied improvements were made, but only 
that the CEC has made its presence felt and enforcement was, at least, being considered.
When asked if overall environmental conditions have improved since the
NAFTA/NAAEC package went into force and to what degree could this be attributed to
the agreements Mr. Ward said he was:
Opposed to any definitive statement that NAFTA environmental policies have 
failed. If you look at all three countries, where forward progress has been made 
and cases where it has not, it is hard to evaluate or attribute directly to either 
agreement. Conditions are probably worse off, but not always.
He said NAFTA has been a “mixed bag” and to further evaluate the success or failure of
the side agreements based on whether environmental conditions have improved is
misleading and not that significant. “People are more aware of the problems, as
awareness grows, civic minded environmentalism will grow, and eventually this
translates into improvements.” According to Mr. Ward this is an approach that has been
utilized successfully by individuals and organizations, which is facilitated by the
NAAEC.
Mr. Ward said that it is “remarkable that the commission still exists as this is a period 
of inadequate support for internal development.” He claimed many environmental 
related government programs have been cut but, so far, the CEC has been left alone. Mr. 
Ward said the Commission has made all three governments uncomfortable and the 
independence of the CEC has been used to good effect, but has caused tension. He said 
the fact that politicians have not stripped the CEC likely means they are doing some 
good.
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Discussion
Mr. Ward said, regarding the structure of the CEC that, “some approaches have 
worked others have not." He claimed that before environmental conditions improve civic 
minded awareness must grow. He also said that the CEC is a fledgling form of 
multilateral environmental governance that should be supported. The following section 
explores these points and examines how the structure of the CEC is an integral part of 
maintaining the credibility of the submissions process under Articles 14 and 15.
The NAAEC established the first regional environmental organization, the CEC, in 
North America with innovative mandates for integrating trade and environmental issues 
(Knox and Markell 2003). In its ten year history the CEC has set up and facilitated 
numerous multi-national programs, working groups and work plans dealing with issues 
concerning trade, air and water pollutants, hazardous waste, biodiversity, environmental 
law and other related issues. The CEC has established working partnerships and 
collaborations with organizations like the World Bank, the Global Environment Facility, 
the International Joint Commission, and the International Boundary and Water 
commission and have continually sought input from both international and provincial 
NGOs.^^
Over these ten years the CEC has gradually emerged as an environmental information 
center for North America. The Operational Plan of the Commission For Environmental 
Cooperation 2004-2006, calls for the CEC to strengthen its value as an environmental 
database for North America by “facilitating data comparability and information sharing, 
investigating environmental threats and issues through forward looking assessments, and
See CEC: Operational Plan of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 2004-2006.
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informing the public and decision makers of the impacts of environmental degradation on 
human and ecosystem health.” The plan reiterates the intention of the CEC to continue 
making this information available to the public through publication releases such as 
Taking Stock and their periodic State of The Environment Reports.
The credibility of the CEC largely depends on the non-partisan structure of the three 
branches that make up the commission. The expectation is that having a 
multidisciplinary configuration of equal members from each party will ensure the 
integrity of the organization, and the CEC can then act as a cohesive environmental voice 
for North America. “Of the three branches [of the CEC], the Joint Public Advisory 
Committee is arguably the most innovative” (Wirth 2003). The 15 member JPAC (five 
from each country) made clear from its first meeting its intention to function as 
multilateral organization with one voice. After the first meeting in July 1994, the JPAC 
drafted their vision statement, which declared:
While we come from three different nations and have different institutional 
connections, we serve on the JPAC as individual citizens of the North American 
continent, joined in a commitment to preserving and enhancing our common 
environment and to achieving a sustainable society.'^^
The JPAC is mandated to give advice to the CEC Council, comment on the Secretariat
work plan and consult with the public, in open meetings, on issues concerning the CEC
(Markell and Knox 2003). During its first ten years the JPAC has convened multiple
public workshops on a variety of environmental issues in all three participating NAFTA
countries.
The JPAC serves as a liaison between civil society and the council ministers, 
establishing “A link between the North American Public and other bodies of the CEC,
Joint Public Advisory Committee Vision Statement. Washington, D  C. July 26,1994.
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with the objective of promoting public participation in the decision making process of the 
CEC” (Bugeda 1999, p. 1591). In this capacity the JPAC has successfully engaged the 
public in open consultations involving the CEC work plan during council meetings and 
has been called upon, by the council, to clarify the guidelines for the citizen submissions 
process under articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC (Wirth 2003).
In June 2000, Council Resolution 00-09 called upon the JPAC to prepare a report to, 
“help the council improve the citizen submissions process.” In 2001 the JPAC released. 
Lessons Learned; Citizen Submissions under Article 14 and 15 of the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. In this report the JPAC recommended that 
the submission process, “be more timely, open, equitable, accountable and effective.”"̂  
The report also was critical of the discretionary power of the Council in deciding whether 
or not to instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record and the lack of any process for 
appeal should the Council decide against the preparation of a factual record.
Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC are often considered the fundamental attribute of 
the agreement. The International Environmental Law Project, in a report commissioned 
by the JPAC, states:
The Citizen Submission Process is widely regarded as the most innovative and 
closely-watched aspect of the NAFTA environmental side agreement. Many 
regard the Citizen Submission Process as a potential model of accountability and 
governance for a new breed of international institutions-a positive response to 
globalization giving citizens a voice in the often impenetrable affairs of inter­
national organizations.
The credibility of the submissions process and the institutional legitimacy of the CEC are
ultimately dependant upon public perception. If the public believes the CEC cannot
function effectively, the submissions process would likely not be utilized and the
^  JPAC Advice to Council No. 03-05. December 17, 2003.
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integrity of the agreement could be compromised. Resolution 00-09 also sought to 
address this problem when concem was expressed that the Parties were trying to covertly 
revise the Guidelines'*  ̂to hamper public participation in submissions process. Resolution 
00-09 guaranteed the JPAC’s position in facilitating public input in issues related to the 
Articles 14 and 15 guidelines as well as “formulating advice for any proposed guideline 
revisions.” The Resolution also permits the JPAC to conduct a public review on any 
proposed “elaboration” to these articles.
Interview Five
The fifth interview was conducted with Greg Block, former United States CEC
Director. The following biography is from the EnviReform Website and the University of
Toronto at www.envireform.utoronto.ca.
Greg Block is the 2002-2004 Distinguished Environmental Law Scholar at 
Lewis and Clark College of Law in Portland, Oregon. From 1994 to 2002, Mr. 
Block served as the Head of the Legal Division, and later as Director, at North 
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, headquartered in 
Montreal. There, he established the unit responsible for investigating allegations 
that a NAFTA party had failed to enforce its environmental laws effectively, as 
well as overseeing the CEC’s co-operative program area. Mr. Block has also 
taught environmental law in Mexico under the auspices of a Fulbright Lecture 
Grant and co-directed a series of environmental workshops in collaboration with 
FUNDEA, a Mexican environmental non governmental organization, as well as 
Litigated environmental cases with the law firm of Thelen, Martin, Johnson and 
Bridges in San Francisco, California. Mr. Block received his undergraduate degree 
in Political Science from UCLA, and J.D. from McGeorge School of Law in 
Sacramento, California.
In response to the question of how well did the NAAEC address environmental 
concerns, Mr. Block said the agreement calls for the harmonization of many concerns but
See CEC Citizen Submission on Enforcement Matters: Adoption o f the Revised Guidelines for 
Submissions on Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 o f the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation. June 26, 1998.
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does not offer a comprehensive plan for integrating them. He said there are European 
agreements that could be looked to as an example of ways to successfully integrate trade 
and environmental concerns. He claimed the U.S. instead looked at Canadian and 
Mexican environmental law accords and then related the agreement strictly to 
enforcement.
Mr. Block said this basis is flawed. The more pressing problem is environmental 
infrastructure both technical, such as lack of hazardous waste disposal facilities, and 
legislative, in the form of regulation and enforcement. He felt it was difficult to enforce 
environmental laws in a given country, when infrastructure support to adequately address 
a specific problem was non-existent. He referred to the disposal of hazardous waste in 
one state of Mexico as an example where there is only one plant for hazardous waste 
disposal available for a large area, and bringing the hazardous material from outside the 
area to the plant is cost prohibitive.'*^ The problem, according to Mr. Block, is not 
whether a country is enforcing their environmental laws but how to raise the 
environmental infrastructure to a level where existing laws can then be applicable.
When asked in what areas the CEC has been successful Mr. Block replied that the 
mechanism of discretionary power has been used judiciously by the Secretariat and has 
been very successful. Mr. Block said, ‘The quality of investigations under Article 13 has 
led to tangible public policy.” He said the Secretariat has used its own experts to 
investigate certain problems while encouraging anyone or group, with relevant 
information on an issue under investigation, to come forward and present their findings.
Mexico has only one authorized, operating hazardous waste disposal site located in Mexico’s Northern 
region outside o f Monterrey, Nuevo Leon. Alliance Consulting International. 2000. Pulse Point Newsletter. 
January.
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and this approach has gone a long way in establishing the integrity and credibility of the 
Secretariat.
Mr. Block was asked whether governments have been reluctant to cooperate in any 
investigations. He said governments have utilized forbearance under Article 13 and have 
been cooperative. Mr. Block said that recently, however, the participating governments 
have applied pressure to limit and change the scope of factual records under Articles 14 
and 15 of the NAAEC.
Discussion
Mr. Block was critical of the NAAEC’s use of enforcement as a measure of 
environmental harmonization, particularly when environmental regulations are 
inconsistent between countries and the infrastructure of a participating country lacks the 
means to effectively enforce existing environmental regulations. Mr. Block said there are 
past and existing agreements in both the U.S. and Europe that establish precedent for 
multilateral harmonization in regards to environmental regulation. The following 
discussion examines these points and further explores the Article 13 Secretariat Reports, 
which Mr. Block claims have, so far, been successful.
In reference to environmental policy coordination. Article 10(2) of the NAAEC states, 
‘The Council may consider, and develop recommendations regarding;” then lists several 
areas where the Council might take an interest. Should the Council develop 
recommendations regarding tri-lateral environmental policy, none of the three countries 
would be obligated to act on any of these recommendations. A significant critique of the
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agreement is the lack of a substantive commitment by the participating Parties towards 
environmental harmonization.
Presidential candidate Bill Clinton, during the 1992 presidential campaign, stated that 
he wanted an agreement that had “the power to provide remedies, including money 
damages and the legal power to stop pollution [and] substantial powers to prevent and 
clean up water pollution.”'̂  ̂The NAAEC allows the Council to levy monetary 
assessments that can be used to clean up the environment but the Council has no 
authority to act on its own to clean up, stop or prevent pollution in any of the 
participating countries (Chamovitz 1994). The NAAEC does not hold the Parties to an 
international environmental standard; rather, it obligates the Parties to effectively enforce 
the existing environmental laws in their respective countries. The Clinton Administration 
claimed this was an unprecedented commitment towards environmental enforcement and 
basing the environmental enforcement standards on each country’s domestic law was 
seen as preferable to and less intrusive than an alternative minimum international 
standard (Chamovitz 1994).
This approach has been criticized for a number of reasons. Steve Chamovitz, in a 
1994 article in the Temple International and Comparative Law Journal wrote, “The 
parochial laws of a country may be inadequate for its own environmental needs as well as 
for the rest of North America. When laws are inadequate, rigorous enforcement will 
provide little benefit” (p. 13). Chamovitz points out that a country that enforces a 
deficient environmental law in its own country would be in compliance with the NAAEC 
as would a country that lowered its environmental law to avoid NAAEC scrutiny. In a
Candidate Bill Clinton’s Proposal for Supplemental Agreements on NAFTA. 1993. In Beyond NAFTA, 
The Western Hemisphere Interface 192. Dobell, R. and M. Neufeld. May. In Chamovitz 1994, 11.
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1993 letter to then U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, the National Governors 
Association stated “a party should not be able to complain about a lack of enforcement by 
another party of a standard higher than its own.”"̂® Under the NAAEC, a plaintiff country 
need not implement a law, it claims, the defendant country does not enforce if that law 
does not exist in the plaintiff country (Chamovitz 1994).
Critics also contend that previous or existing international agreements were not 
considered or looked to for precedent when the NAAEC was structured. The Agreement 
on the European Economic Area incorporates environmental regulation and protection 
with economic expansion within the context of the agreement (1994). Numerous other 
international agreements entered into by the United States, prior to NAFTA, established 
international standards on “fisheries, weights and measures, health, communications, 
postal delivery, intellectual property, statistics, sanitation, labor, conservation and 
customs cooperation” (Chamovitz 1994, p. 12). The concept of an intemational board of 
review has successfully been implemented in the past. In 1925 The Opium Convention 
established an independent board to monitor the opium trade. Over 50 years ago the 
Opium Board was granted the power to propose corrective measures or issue public 
statements to, or about, countries that were not in compliance with international norms 
(Chamovitz 1994). The European Union created intemational legislative and judicial 
commissions with the authority to pass binding legislation as well as review and 
invalidate domestic laws (Tarlock and Thorson 2003).
Under Article 13 of the NAAEC the Secretariat may prepare reports on any matter 
within the scope of the annual work program without Council approval or on any other
Governor’s Letter on NAFTA Environmental Pact, Inside U.S. Trade 4. July 16, 1993. In Chamovitz 
1994, 14; note 226.
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environmental matter related to the cooperative functions of the NAAEC unless the 
Council objects by a two-thirds vote (NAAEC art. 13(1)). The experience of the CEC, to 
date, has proven the work program to be fairly extensive, thereby empowering the 
Secretariat to report on almost any environmental issue in North America it considers 
worth exploring (Markell and Knox 2003). The Secretariat has, thus far, prepared five 
Article 13 reports on; maize and biodiversity; electricity; migratory bird habitat; North 
American pollutant pathways; and the Silva Reservoir.
The report of the Ten-year Review and Assessment Committee (TRAC), sponsored 
by the CEC and given the task of assessing the NAAEC’s first ten years stated:
While many observers have found these [reports] to be of high quality and a 
useful contribution to the understanding of the issues, government officials have 
sometimes found the reports to be of inconsistent quality and limited usefulness.
If some government officials singled out the report on electricity markets as 
having been particularly timely, others expressed concerns over some of the 
background material prepared for the report on maize (2004, p. 18).
While the usefulness of the information from the Article 13 reports may have been
questioned in some circles, the CEC has been credited with bringing together highly
specialized multi-disciplinary teams from the private and public sector that have
produced thorough investigative environmental reports that have influenced public policy
(TRAC 2004). Tarlock and Thorson claim that while Article 13 does not have the power
to influence public and private behavior with the threat of enforcement, it does give the
CEC considerable power to “shine a light into places” the Parties might rather remain
dark (2003, p. 214).
According to Mr. Block Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC have recently come under 
pressure from the participating governments and attempts have been made to limit the 
scope of the factual records. The citizen submissions process under Articles 14 and 15
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received wide support in the environmental community as a means to effectively address 
the issue of slack enforcement and outright non-enforcement of domestic laws in the 
participating countries (Kibel 2003). While the Secretariat ostensibly reviews citizen 
submissions then makes recommendations to the Council on whether a factual record is 
warranted, it is ultimately up to the Council to decide if a factual record is to be prepared. 
Concerns about possible conflicts of interest were raised regarding the structure of this 
process:
[namely] that the nation that was the subject of the non-enforcement claims in 
a citizen submission was also entitled to vote (through its national representative 
on the CEC Council) on whether to approve the preparation or otherwise limit the 
scope of a factual record to investigate these claims. (Kibel 2003, p. 2)
The JPAC’s Lessons Learned (2001) report clearly outlines the potential conflict and
makes recommendations on how to proceed, with regards to Articles 14 and 15, to avoid
possible future disagreement.
The JPAC’s report was prompted from public outcry over efforts of the Council, in 
1999 through June 2000, to change the guidelines of the submission process. After this 
report was released, in May 2001, the Council articulated its support in Council 
Resolution 01-06. At that time the Council had only once decided against the 
Secretariats recommendation regarding the preparation of a factual record.'*^
In November 2001, the Council decided in favor of the preparation of five factual 
records submitted by the Secretariat but with a significant modification: the Council 
limited the scope of inquiry on four of the submissions. In all four cases citizens 
submitted complaints against a participating country alluding to a pattern of failing to 
enforce an environmental law. In each case specific examples were given to illustrate
See Council Resolution 00-01. May 16,2000.
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this pattern. The Council’s decision allowed factual records to be prepared only as they 
applied to the specific examples cited, essentially prohibiting any attempt to show a 
persistent pattern of failure by the accused Parties (Wold 2003).
This decision was immediately attacked as an attempt to undermine the independence 
of the Secretariat and the credibility of the submission process. The JPAC, in Advice To 
Council: NO. 01-07 states, “[JPAC] is compelled to express its frustration at being forced 
to advise on issues related to Articles 14 and 15, because past agreed-upon procedures are 
being ignored or circumvented.” The “agreed-upon procedures” the JPAC refer to is 
Council Resolution 00-09 released in June 2000, where Council agreed that any 
amendments to the guidelines, or any issues related to Articles 14 and 15 the Council 
“proposes to address,” should first be submitted to the JPAC for public review. The 
JPAC further charge that these decisions “constitute a flagrant disregard...with respect to 
supporting the independence of the Secretariat.” ®̂ The JPAC claimed that the factual 
records could no longer produce evidence of pervasive patterns of enforcement failures if 
the records are restricted to only the specific examples meant to show such cumulative 
effects.
Numerous groups also suggest political motivation behind the Council’s decision. 
The Sierra Legal Defence Fund stated, in a letter to the JPAC, “Despite previous 
commitments of the three countries to support and respect the integrity of the citizen 
submissions process, these Council Resolutions leave an impression of political 
manipulation and failure to respect the independence and judgment of the Secretariat” 
(Sierra Legal 2003). In a 2001 letter to then U.S. EPA Administrator Christine Todd 
Whitman, the U.S. Government Advisory Committee wrote:
JPAC Advice to Council. 03-05. December 17, 2003.
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We are concerned that, by allowing a Party to a submission the latitude to define 
the scope of the factual record, as currently advocated by the U.S., the 
independence historically exercised by the Secretariat in the submission process 
will be eviscerated. If the Secretariat’s independence is undercut in the 
manner proposed by the U.S., there will be no future credibility to the submission 
process.
Chris Wold, Director of the International Environmental Law Project argues that the 
Council’s actions are “ultra vires beyond its authority in the NAAEC” (2003, p. 4), 
claiming that Article 15 grants Council the power to deny or reject the Secretariat’s 
recommendation to prepare a factual record, but not the authority to limit the scope of 
factual records, which is the purview of the Secretariat. In other words, according to 
Wold, the NAAEC allows the Council to reject the preparation of a factual record, but it 
permits the Secretariat, not the Council, to decide the scope of the factual record. Wold 
is arguing that the Council cannot grant permission of a factual record sent to it by the 
Secretariat and then put specific limits as to what it may include in its investigation, if 
doing so changes the scope of the original factual record prepared by the Secretariat.
The JPAC concedes that the issue regarding the citizen submissions process “may indeed 
reflect a structural challenge within the NAAEC itself,” but it considers the question of 
whether the Council is being influenced by the Parties to “be of sufficient concern” to 
justify additional investigation.^^
National Advisory Committee Letter to the U.S. Representative to the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation. October 15, 2001.
JPAC Advice to Council 03-05. December 17, 2003.
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Interview Six
The sixth interview was conducted with Daniel Magraw, President and Executive
Officer of the Center for International Law (CIEL), Located in Washington D C. The
following biography is from the CIEL website at www.ciel.org/Staff/magraw.html.
Mr. Magraw is currently the chief executive officer for CIEL. From 1992-2001, 
Mr. Magraw was Director of the International Environmental Law Office at the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. During that period, he served on scores of 
United States delegations to international negotiations and other meetings. He took 
leave to co-chair a White House assessment of how the United States regulates 
genetically engineered organisms and to be the Acting Principal Deputy 
Administrator of the Office of International Activities at the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. From 1983-92, he was professor of 
International Law at the University of Colorado, where he taught Public 
International Law, International Environmental Law, International Business 
Transactions, and International Development Policy and the Law. Mr. Magraw has 
a J.D. degree from the University of California, Berkeley, where he was Editor-in 
Chief of the California Law Review, and a B.A. in Economics from Harvard 
University.
In answer to the question of how well did the NAAEC address environmental 
concerns, Mr. Magraw said at the time it seemed good but it was an experiment. He said 
it looked at concerns not addressed in NAFTA. He claimed the citizen submissions and 
cooperative activities have been positive but the dispute settlement procedure between 
Parties in Part Five of the agreement has not been effective.
When asked if public participation as outlined in the NAAEC has had an impact, Mr. 
Magraw said, “yes it has, the agreement focused attention on these concerns.” He said 
the submissions process has made a major difference as each investigation brings closer 
scrutiny and attention to environmental problems and governments are paying more 
attention to cooperative functions. Mr. Magraw said the commitments in the NAAEC 
have been successful, yet there are areas where there could be improvement but citizen
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awareness has to be high for many of the processes to work and the issues are often too 
political.
In response to the question that the agreement has often been criticized for not having 
more teeth and does he think more could have been done, Mr. Magraw said the 
agreements were as good as they were going to get. He said at the time of the agreement 
negotiations environmental proponents were excited about the agreements while free 
trade proponents were not. He claimed NAFTA was not going to be reopened, and the 
NGOs had done a lot as it was. He added that Canada and Mexico did not like the 
agreements being politicized or having to go back to the NAFTA text, which was 
something they were not going to do.
Discussion
Part Five of the NAAEC, which Mr. Magraw claims has been ineffective, outlines the 
Party-to-Party dispute resolution process. This section describes the legal course of 
action when one Party accuses another Party of failing to enforce its own environmental 
laws. A lengthy litigation process then follows and, if a Party is found guilty, a penalty is 
levied which can be trade sanctions in Mexico or the U.S., and fines in Canada (Kirton 
2004). In a September 2000 letter to the JPAC, John Knox, who at the time was chair of 
the U.S. National Advisory Committee wrote, “One important lesson from the first five 
years of the CEC is that the threat of Part Five sanctions is not only useless, it may be 
worse than useless, as a way to support an effective submissions procedure.” Knox 
further suggested that an institutionalized system of cooperation rather than confrontation
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might be more productive (Knox 2000). In the first ten years of the NAAEC, the Part 
Five provisions have never been utilized (Kirton 2002).
Mr. Magraw said the NAAEC has been successful in other areas such as: establishing 
cooperative functions between multilateral participants aimed at environmental issues, the 
commitments and obligations of the Parties and the impact of the submissions process. In 
the paper international Institutions, Sustainability Knowledge and Policy Change: The 
North American Experience, presented at the 2002, Berlin Conference, John Kirton 
explains how the CEC, through its science based environmental organization, has 
influenced public policy in all three member countries. Kirton presents four mechanisms 
critical to CEC’s success in facilitating knowledge-based change. These mechanisms are: 
the “top down” Article 13 reports; the “bottom up” Article 14-15 citizen submissions 
process; the CEC’s “Taking Stock” state of the environment report; and the “NAFTA 
Effects” program related to Article I0(6)(d). Kirton explains how each area has been a 
“test case of the hypothesis of international science producing national policy change 
through the three P’s,” which he identifies as research potential, issue prominence and 
expert participation (2002, p. 2).
Kirton further analyzes how the Article 13 reports “have had a clear effect in 
stimulating action” and facilitated cooperative problem solving by mobilizing a broad 
array of stakeholders (2002, p. 3). The submissions process, according to Kirton, has had 
both direct and indirect influence on government and civil society. He focuses primarily 
on Mexico and discusses how the act of initiating a submission, by civil society or 
NGOs’, is an indicator that the system has value and thus influences behavior toward 
change. By the same token Kirton claims that the resistance by governments in all three
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countries to the Article 14 and 15 processes, and the continued efforts by the Parties to 
change these procedures is also an indicator that they are having an effect.
The commitments of the Parties in the NAAEC fall under the larger context of
“Obligations” in Part Two of the agreement. Article 2 is the first article in Part Two and
delineates “General Commitments” of the Parties. These include:
[to] periodically prepare and make public reports on the state of the environment; 
develop and review emergency preparedness measures; promote environmental 
education; further scientifie research and technology development; assess as 
appropriate environmental impacts; and promote the use of economic instruments for 
the efficient achievement of environmental goals (l(a-f)).
The Ten-year Review and Assessment Committee (TRAC) referred to the CEC as the
Parties “institution of ehoice for trilateral environmental cooperation and for assessing
the link ages between NAFTA and the environment” (2004, p. 48). Given that each
Council member can be considered the representatives of their respective governments,
the Parties may be viewed, in a loose sense, as attempting to meet some of their
commitments under the NAAEC.
Article 12 of the NAAEC states “The Secretariat shall prepare an annual report of the
Commission [and] the report shall cover the actions taken by each Party in connection
with its obligations under this Agreement”(2(c)), but in practice the Parties themselves
prepare the chapters in the report addressing their performance in regards to meeting their
obligations (TRAC 2004). The Ten-year Review Committee asserts the Parties
contribution to the annual report is difficult to assess. Primarily because there is no
standard by which to measure environmental performance and the Parties have different
criteria for determining what is relevant to include, thus making it difficult to compare
their contributions. The TRAC also states that the CEC’s ability to effectively address
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other issues related to the commitments has been hindered because of the political 
sensitivity of some of the issues to one or more of the parties.
Mr. Magraw said, with regards to stronger enforcement provisions within the 
NAAEC, “the agreement was as good as [its] going to get.” During the initial NAAEC 
negotiations between the United States, Canada and Mexico the Parties agreed there 
would be no reopening of the NAFTA text to include any additional environmental 
provisions. President Bush in 1992 only agreed on a “parallel track” approach to secure 
enough votes in congress to pass NAFTA (Johnson and Beaulieu 1996). Canada and 
Mexico were not in favor of the NAAEC, regarding the agreement as “the bitter pill they 
had to live with in order for the U.S. to sign NAFTA” (Abel 2003, p. 3). Mexico only 
warmed up to the NAAEC when the focus of the agreement shifted from enforcement 
with teeth to cooperation, and Canada went along with the agreement only after they 
were exempted from trade sanctions. (Magraw 1994).
Interview Seven
The Seventh interview was conducted with former CEC member, Carla Sbert. The
following biography is from the EnviReform website at the University of Toronto at
www.envireform.utoronto.ca.
From 1998 to 2003, Ms. Sbert was Legal Officer of the Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters Unit at the North American Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation, reviewing submissions filed by citizens on alleged failures by 
Canada, Mexico and the United States to enforce environmental laws, and 
preparing factual records. Focusing on environmental law and policy, she has 
worked in the Mexican government, in a New York City law firm and in 
Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Pemex. Ms. Sbert also lectured at the 
Mexican Autonomous Institute of Technology (ITAM) on the Mexican legal 
system and on the NAFTA environment package. She was trained in law at IT AM 
and obtained a Master of Laws degree from Harvard Law School.
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Ms. Sbert said, in response to the question of how well did the NAAEC address 
environmental concerns that it depended on your point of view regarding what might 
have happened. She said the provisions of the NAAEC went very far in addressing 
environmental concerns, even in a toothless way, especially in Mexico, where the 
creation of avenues for civil participation was new. She said she was surprised the 
environmental lobby got so much in the agreement and that environmental concerns were 
addressed effectively, but the hoped-for ends have not resulted.
When asked if the emphasis that the agreement placed on the enforcement of 
environmental regulation has had an impact in Mexico, Ms. Sbert replied that 
enforcement has improved very little but there is no benchmark for comparison. She said 
you could compare the number of inspectors and inspections now to those prior to the 
agreement but you would need to understand what the conditions looked like; she added 
that there has been some embryonic changes in the attitude of government.
Ms. Sbert’s response to the question of whether the submissions process and civil 
participation has been effective in Mexico was that there are some examples in factual 
records and submissions where conditions did change after a submission was filed to 
improve the existing situation. She said the Aquanova Factual Record has had an impact 
and the Cozumel Factual Record brought about changes in the law. Ms. Sbert said in 
some cases nothing happened and in others attention is sometimes brought to 
environmental issues, she said the CEC reports are descriptive of what has been done.
Ms. Sbert said that while the agreement has provided an avenue for citizen complaint 
in Mexico, the process has had little impact and the changes have been slow. She said 
one thing that is clear in Mexico is the environmental groups have gained a respectability
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and influence they did not have before the agreement. The Mexican government, thanks 
to the agreement and the CEC, now recognizes NGOs. Ms. Sbert claimed The CEC 
meetings in Mexico and their office in Mexico City have had an impact by giving 
Mexican civil society a recognized and vested interest in the CEC and the environmental 
concerns being analyzed.
In response to the question of whether more emphasis should have been placed on, 
and funds allocated for, infrastructure in Mexico, Ms. Sbert said that infrastructure 
support was addressed in the Border Side Agreement. She said the fact that each country 
contributes equally could be expensive for Mexico, but this gives Mexico some weight. 
Had Mexico been treated less equally they may have had less weight.
Ms. Sbert’s reply to the question of whether any recognizable upward harmonization 
has occurred in the border region in Mexico contributable to the agreement was, “no, 
there has been absolutely no upward harmonization in the border region.” She said that 
many companies that have a problem with the environmental restrictions are simply 
relocating to China.
Discussion
Ms. Sbert said the submission process in Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC and 
ensuing civil participation has led to specific instances of change in Mexico. The next 
section examines these instances and also explores Ms. Sbert’s claim that Mexican NGOs 
have benefited from the agreement, and what impact this might have in regards to 
environmental procedure in Mexico.
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On October 24, 1996 the CEC released the Cozumel Factual Record, the first factual 
record released under Article 14 of the NAAEC.^^ The petition, filed on behalf of the 
Mexican Center for Environmental Law, the International Group of One Hundred and the 
Cozumel-based Natural Resources Protection Committee, alleged that the Mexican 
Government failed to enforce its environmental law when it approved the Cozumel 
Cruise Ship Pier Project without a complete environmental impact assessment (Border 
Briefs 1997). The pier was being constructed in an ecologically sensitive coral reef area 
in Cozumel, Mexico and the petition claimed the assessment was incomplete because it 
dealt only with the construction of the pier in the water and not the impact of the port 
development on land (Garver 2001).
The initial reaction of the Mexican government to the creation of a factual record 
was hostile but this only led to greater publicity for the issue and “called forth a 
constituency supportive of the environmental case” (Kirton 2002, p. 5-6). Subsequent to 
the public outcry and release of the factual record the Mexican Government reversed 
their position and President Zedillo declared the Cozumel reefs to be a natural protected 
area. The Mexican Government also signed a collaboration agreement with the petition 
submitter to manage the protected areas around Cozumel, “More broadly, the case 
influenced the reform of Mexico’s environmental law of 1996, created environmental 
awareness in the Cozumel region, and encouraged other cases to be sent through to the 
factual record stage” (Kirton 2002, p. 6). Gustavo Alanis-Ortega, president of the 
Mexican Center for Environmental Law, one of the submitters of the petition, concluded 
that in the Cozumel case the CEC’s citizen “spotlight” had ultimately worked.
See www.cec.org.
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On June 23, 2003 the CEC released the Aquanova Factual Record on allegations that 
Mexico failed to effectively enforce its environmental law by allowing a shrimp farm in 
Nayarit, Mexico destroy mangrove forests and fill w e t l a n d s .T h e  original submission 
was filed on October 20, 1998 by Grupo Ecologico “Manglar” and asserts that the 
authorities have failed to effectively enforce legal provisions for the protection of 
rainforests specifically in regards to certain mangrove and migratory bird species, 
environmental impact requirements, wastewater discharge, and provisions on fisheries 
and the introduction of alien species.^^ Although it may be too soon to determine the 
effect the submission and the subsequent factual record might have on the environmental 
concerns discussed, the TRAC stated the submission catalyzed negotiations among the 
submitters, the developer, and local and environmental authorities that led to actions to 
reduce the impact of the farm’s waste water discharge as well as a mangrove replanting 
program.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies claimed that the investigation of 
citizens’ complaints from numerous NGOs in Mexico has given the Mexican Secretariat 
of the Environment and Natural Resources increased political leverage to deal with the 
detrimental effects of various projects on the environment in Mexico. International 
exposure through the CEC has strengthened the institutional capacity of NGOs in 
Mexico, which has lead to international funding for many of their activities (Gilbreath 
2001). From 1996 to 2003, 109 non-profit community organizations in Mexico received
See CEC Latest News; CEC releases factual record on Aquanova shrimp farm in Mexico. Montreal, 25 
June 2003.
See CEC Citizen Submission on Enforcement Matters: Aquanova. Mexico, 20 October 1998.
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grants for local and area wide projects from the CEC through its North American Fund 
for Environmental Cooperation (NAFEC).^®
According to observers, technical support and funding have paved the way for 
recognition in the international forum for Mexican NGOs and facilitated the exchange of 
technical expertise and information with both Canadian and American NGOs (Silvan 
2004). Regular interactions among the CEC, government representatives and NGOs has 
also helped in the recognition of common agendas in Mexico, such as the loss of 
biodiversity, deforestation and the need to strengthen Mexico’s institutional ability to 
address environmental concerns. Although obvious differences in priorities exist 
between Mexican environmental officials and Mexican NGOs, SEMARNAT^^ officials 
are “particularly supportive of the citizen submission process” (Gilbreath 2001, p. 34). 
SEMARNAT representatives assert that international attention spotlighting its own 
performance pressures other areas of Mexican government to conduct legitimate 
assessments of the environmental impacts from proposed construction projects. This 
pressure, applied through Articles 14 and 15 at the behest of various NGOs, has prompted 
Mexican officials to scale back some projects that would have caused significant 
environmental degradation (Gilbreath 2001).
The following are the results from the interviews: a + sign signifies the interview 
subject indicated the agreement was successful in addressing this criterion; a -  sign 
signifies the interview subject indicated the agreement was unsuccessful in addressing 
this criterion; a* signifies the interview subject indicated this criterion was invalid; n/a 
indicates the criterion was not discussed in the interview.
The NAFEC was discontinued in 2003.
Secretari del Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. This translates in English to Mexican Department o f  
Environmental Affairs and Natural Resources.
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Table 1. Interview Summary
Criterion Interview
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Enforcement + n/a — * — + —
Public
Involvement
+ + n/a + + + +
Upward
Harmonization —




+ + + + + + +
Visibility,
Awareness
+ + n/a + n/a + 4-
Involvement of 
NGOs




n/a n/a + _ +
Effectiveness 
of the CEC
n/a + + + + + n/a
Good
Beginning
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Table 1 illustrates that:
- Interview I and 6 found the enforcement criterion successful; 1, 3, 5 and 7 
found it unsuccessful and 4 found it an invalid criterion as to the success or 
failure of the agreement.
- Interview 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 found the public involvement criterion successful.
- Interview 1, 3,4, 5, and 7 found the upward harmonization criterion unsuccessful.
- All 7 interviews found the factual record and dissemination criterion successful.
- Interview 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7 found the visibility/awareness criterion successful.
- Interview 2,4, 5 and 6 found the involvement of NGOs criterion successful and 1 
found it invalid.
- Interviews 3 and 4 found the cooperation of national governments criterion 
successful and 5 found it both successful and unsuccessful.
- Interviews 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 found the effectiveness of the CEC criterion 
successful.
- Interviews 1, 2, 4 and 6 found the good beginning criterion successful; 3 and 5 
found it unsuccessful.
- Interviews 2 and 3 found the interaction with NAFTA criterion unsuccessful and 4 
found it invalid.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion
The NAAEC was created to address environmental concerns left out of NAFTA and 
to ensure that existing environmental regulations in all three participating countries, 
particularly in Mexico, were enforced. The objectives of the agreement included 
promoting mutually supportive environmental and economic policies, promoting 
transparency and supporting the environmental goals and objectives of NAFTA; which 
included promoting sustainable development. In order for the NAAEC to meet or 
attempt to meet these objectives, interaction with numerous NAFTA commissions and 
organizations by various institutions and groups, created by the NAAEC, to address a 
multitude of issues, would be necessary.
Interpretation of the results from Table 1 show that the interview subjects found the 
NAAEC successfully addressed 6 out of the 10 criteria. If each criterion is weighed 
equally in terms of the performance of the agreement then, overall, these results indicate 
the agreement had a 60% success rate. This would also indicate that the NAAEC was 
moderately successful in addressing environmental concerns. While these results may 
have answered the initial question in this study of how well the agreement addressed 
environmental concern, it would be misleading to interpret this to mean the NAAEC, on 
the whole, was successful as well.
Data concluded that the NAAEC was unsuccessful in interacting with NAFTA and 
evidence presented in the previous chapter shows that the CEC, the institution created by
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the NAAEC and mandated to meet the objectives and goals of the agreement, has been 
shut out of virtually all meetings and negotiations with any NAFTA commission. On the 
criterion of enforcement Table 1 indicated the agreement was also unsuccessful, thus 
failing to live up to another of the fundamental objectives of the agreement. Interviews 1 
and 6, who found this criterion successful, found it successful in specific instances but 
stated in their interviews that the overall impact was negligible.
The NAAEC was supposed to bring greater transparency to the free trade 
organizations of NAFTA, something it was also unable to do as a result of being shut out 
of the very organizations it was supposed to bring transparency to. Table 1 indicated the 
3 criteria; public involvement, factual records and dissemination, and 
visibility/awareness^ which all involve transparency, were successful, yet these criteria all 
dealt with the performance of the CEC as a function of the NAAEC, and were not a 
measure of the performance of the NAAEC as a whole. Therefore, while each criterion 
in Table 1 can be weighed equally as a measure of how well the NAAEC addressed 
environmental concern, each criterion does not carry equal weight as a determining factor 
of whether the agreement succeeded in meeting its initial objectives. Only by first 
effectively meeting the criteria enforcement and interaction with NAFTA both initial 
objectives of the NAAEC could the agreement, on the whole, be considered successful.
The NAAEC did not adequately address the environmental concerns as envisioned by 
the original negotiators who had hoped for a strong environmental agreement. The 
agreement was flawed from the beginning as the parallel status of the NAAEC, in effect, 
set the agreement up to fail. With no mandated authority to interact with the NAFTA 
commissions in any environmental disputes relating to trade, the NAAEC essentially
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became an environmental smokescreen for NAFTA. NAFTA received a “green” label 
because of the NAAEC, yet it is not required to seek any type of environmental 
permission or even counsel from the CEC before making trade related decisions that 
impact the environment.
One of the events that catalyzed the environmental community to take action to make 
NAFTA “greener” was the GATT Tuna-Dolphin ruling. The environmental lobby 
wanted greater transparency and participation in the NAFTA decision making process 
involving environmental disputes to counter rulings like that one. In the early 1990’s 
(and today) the structure of most neo-liberal trade agreements only allowed closed door 
judicial proceedings whose decisions were not subject to appeal, or even scrutiny, by any 
outside agency. Yet the NAAEC never adequately addressed this issue and without 
having environmental considerations adopted as an integral part of NAFTA procedures, it 
is doubtful it ever could, no matter how many “teeth” the agreement might have been 
granted.
NAFTA requires that companies meet the environmental regulations and standards of 
the country where they are doing business and the NAAEC, through the CEC, is 
mandated to ensure these national regulations and laws are enforced. One of the 
motivations behind Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC was to ensure that the 
environmental standards of a NAFTA country are enforced. Under Article 14 a private 
citizen or NOG can make a submission to the CEC that a company is not meeting their 
host countries environmental standards, the CEC can then investigate and, under Article 
15, create a Factual Record. If the CEC Council agrees by a two-thirds vote, the Factual
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Record is released to the public in hopes that this will be sufficient to force the host 
country to take action.
The CEC has no police powers so the involvement of the CEC ends here. If the 
offending company still violates applicable laws and regulations and the host country 
chooses not to take action, the CEC has no authority to levy fines or penalties. Under 
Part Five of the NAAEC the CEC may levy a fine or impose sanctions if one country 
complains to the CEC that another country is not enforcing its own environmental 
standards, but this has never been utilized most likely because it is too politically volatile. 
These procedures are the primary methods available to the CEC through which both 
regulatory environmental enforcement (through the submissions process), and 
transparency (through the creation of a factual record were to be achieved.
The Articles 14 and 15 process is unique and has worked well in specific instances 
such as the Cozumel Factual Record, yet, by not allowing the CEC to take punitive action 
against a government or offending company on its own volition (since Part Five requires 
complaint by another government), there is no great incentive for governments or 
companies to cooperate, and the NAAEC again falls short of meeting desired ends (which 
in this case is increased regulatory enforcement). In addition, under Article 14, for a 
submission to advance towards a factual record the individual or group who filed the 
submission must have exhausted all civil process for complaint in the respective country. 
By the time the Factual Record is created the respective government is aware of the issue 
and if it has not yet acted, it is unlikely that it would unless the publicity generated 
enough pressure to make it in the best interest of the government to do so.
87
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
From the onset of the agreement these shortcomings in the NAAEC were criticized 
and are why the agreement has often been referred to as “toothless and why many 
political analysts maintain the NAAEC was created to give political cover to pro-trade 
democrats in the U.S. for their NAFTA “swing” vote (Fitzmaurice 2003). It is difficult to 
argue with this conclusion given the fact that, in addition to these limitations, the CEC 
has an annual budget of only $9 million (US) with which to meet all the mandates of the 
agreement, with no automatic increases without first petitioning the participating 
governments for more funds. This limitation all but ensures the NAAEC can do very little 
towards meeting its goals and objectives. Wesley Smith from the Heritage Foundation, 
in an early assessment of the agreement, wrote, “Although these side agreements are 
troublesome and establish worrisome precedents, the protectionists are correct: they are 
largely meaningless” (1993).
Interview 4 (Ward) indicated that the criteria of enforcement and interaction with 
NAFTA were invalid as measurements of success for the NAAEC. In his interview, Mr. 
Ward said that the agreements were new and experimental and that what is important is 
not whether the NAAEC succeeded or failed overall, but to take what worked from the 
agreement and learn from the mistakes. The data suggests what did work from the 
NAAEC was the effectiveness of the CEC, public involvement, factual records and 
dissemination, visibility/awareness and the involvement of NGOs.
Evidence presented in the previous chapter showed that the positive aspects of the 
agreement almost all came from functions of the CEC. Even though the CEC was 
excluded from most of the NAFTA institutions it moved forward with its own initiatives 
and mandates, pursuant to Articles 10-16 of the NAAEC. It was in this approach that the
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CEC implemented the criteria the interview subjects found successful. Although the 
NAAEC may have failed to live up to its initial objectives, this agreement created the 
CEC which the data suggests has been successful, despite the limitations placed on it by 
the initial structure of the NAAEC.
Articles 14 and 15 may not have brought transparency to NAFTA institutions but they 
have been used effectively by the CEC, particularly in Mexico where, previously, private 
citizens or groups had no recourse for these types of complaints. The process of preparing 
a factual record has, in each case, led to attention being drawn to specific areas of 
environmental concern, which led to a dialogue seeking cooperative solutions in the 
Aquanova case, and the Cozumel Factual Record instigated policy change in the region.
The Article 13 Secretariat reports have also been used judiciously and to good effect. 
These reports have been referred to as the “Roving Spotlight” which can be used, at the 
discretion of the Secretariat, to investigate and prepare reports under the CEC’s own 
initiative (Kirton 2002). The five reports prepared thus far, despite some criticism, have 
been praised in the environmental and scientific community for their thoroughness and 
high quality. Conceivably the most important accomplishment of the Article 13 reports is 
that they have shown that cooperative solutions can be accomplished by seeking input 
from, and bringing together, a variety of stakeholders in both government and the private 
and public sectors.
The preparation of the Secretariat reports brings attention to the concerns being 
investigated in the same manner as a factual record. Yet the Article 13 reports go much 
further than the factual records, they not only give recommendations on how to proceed 
with corrective measures, they also point out what went wrong or what the threat is and
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why. Of equal significance is that the purpose of the reports is not necessarily to confront 
governments or corporations with evidence of wrongdoing, but to move forward with 
cooperative solutions that accentuate positive linkages between trade and the 
environment and in the process allay some of the inherent fears of transparency that many 
in both the trade community and the member governments appear to have..
Recognizing the limitations of the NAAEC, the CEC has been effective insofar as it 
has increased civic participation and public awareness to environmental concerns in all 3 
participating countries through the citizen submissions process, the Article 13 Secretariat 
Reports and its work programs, which in specific cases have led to policy changes. The 
CEC has evolved into a de facto environmental think tank and information center for 
North America that is increasingly being recognized by both public and private interests 
for the relevance of its information and for its cooperative approach in seeking solutions 
to environmental concerns.
The CEC is the silver lining to an otherwise ineffective environmental agreement. As 
current debates continue on possible free trade agreements between the U.S. and other 
Central and South American countries, the structure and success of the CEC should be 
emulated and included in these or any future trade agreement entered into by the U.S.
The CEC has shown that cooperative solutions involving trade and environmental 
disputes are possible without polarizing the differing points of view.
If, however, environmental concerns are to be seriously considered in any future trade 
agreements entered into by the U.S. they need to be addressed within the text of the trade 
agreement itself. Incorporating environmental concerns within the text of the trade 
agreement will ensure that these concerns are addressed equally and alongside decisions
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involving trade. Critics of this approach often claim that creating environmental 
standards within a trade agreement will restrict trade, yet the European Union which 
allows additional countries to join only after first meeting specific environmental 
requirements, has shown that this is not true. The U.S., as the largest trading partner in 
any trade agreement it enters into, is in a position to make sustainable development a 
prerequisite of partnership, rather than an abstract concept, for any country hoping to gain 
access to U.S. markets.
If we assume that NAFTA was inevitable then it was probably better off with the 
NAAEC than without it and, while a stronger agreement with more “teeth” might have 
been possible, the majority of the interview subjects as well as other opinions presented 
in this study believed this agreement was the best that could be obtained at the time.
This begs the question, of course, as to whether the environment would have been 
better off without NAFTA at all. All that can be said in this regard is that the NAAEC, as 
it is constituted, is not capable of providing the level of environmental protection 
originally sought by members of the U.S. Congress and those NGOs who supported the 
agreement.
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